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L Introduction
This Article, the ninth in a series,1 tabulates and analyzes the vot-
ing behavior of the United States Supreme Court during the 1993
Term.' Our tabulations and statistical analyses are designed to iden-
tify movement in the ideological leanings of individual Justices and of
the Court as an institution. The data for the 1993 Term reveal several
interesting developments.
First, the Court moved to a more liberal position in civil litigation
involving state and federal governments and in litigation raising First
Amendment concerns. Much of this movement, however, came from
unexpected quarters: Justices Blackmun and Stevens began to vote in
favor of state and federal governments and against the First Amend-
ment, "conservative" outcomes, while Justices Scalia and Thomas
took the opposite, and "liberal" tack. This partial reversal of ideologi-
cal poles appears to be the result of the individual Justices' (and the
Court's) reorientation to new political realities.
Second, the Rehnquist Court was, and continues to be, relatively
conservative in its approach to statutory civil rights and jurisdictional
issues. Furthermore, the conservative coalitions that generally deter-
mined the outcome of closely divided cases in 1992 continued to pre-
vail in 1993. Even with the appointment of Justice Ginsburg,
conservative members of the Court-with Justice Kennedy as the pre-
eminent fifth vote-largely retained control of the swing-vote docket.
The 1993 voting record also gave more insight into Justice Sou-
ter's ideologies. Dubbed the "stealth candidate" at the time of his
appointment,3 Justice Souter aligned himself most closely with the lib-
eral members of the Court in 1993 despite his relatively centrist posi-
tion during his first Term on the Court.4
1. Professor Robert E. Riggs began this series with Supreme Court Voting Behavior
1986 Term, 2 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 15 (1988).
2. The 1993 Term covers decisions made from October, 1993 to October, 1994.
3. See, eg., Christopher Scanlan, Nominee Provides a Moment of Drama for Senators,
PEIL. INQUIRER, Sept. 14, 1990, at A10 (recounting story of Souter being labeled as the
"Stealth" nominee by Alabama Senator Howell Heflin).
4. See Robert E. Riggs & Guy L. Black, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1990 Term,
6 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 1 (1992).
H. Mode of Analysis
Our analysis is drawn from a tabulation of each Justice's votes in
ten categories of cases. Nine of the categories are based on the nature
of the issues (First Amendment, Equal Protection, etc.) or the charac-
ter of the parties (that is state and federal government litigants).5 The
tenth category tabulates the number of times each Justice voted with
the majority in cases decided by a single, swing, vote.
These categories are designed to demonstrate each Justice's atti-
tude toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court deci-
sionmaking: individual rights and judicial restraint. The tabulation of
votes in each category demonstrates, in admittedly broad strokes, the
frequency with which individual Justices and the Court as a whole
vote to protect individual rights6 and/or exercise judicial restraint.7
5. These categories include:
1) Civil controversies in which a state, or one of its officials or political subdivisions, is
opposed by a private party.
2) Civil controversies in which the federal government, or one of its agencies or offi-
cials, is opposed by a private party.
3) State criminal cases.
4) Federal criminal cases.
5) First Amendment issues of freedom of speech, press, association, and free exercise
of religion.
6) Equal protection issues.
7) Statutory civil rights claims.
8) Issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing, justiciability, and related
matters.
9) Federalism issues.
6. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the outcome of
state and federal criminal prosecutions (Tbls. 3 and 4), as well as those detailing the resolu-
tion of claims based on the First Amendment (Tbl. 5), the Equal Protection Clause (Tbl.
6), and civil rights statutes (Thl. 7). The civil cases examined in Tables 1 and 2 also involve
individual rights, since these suits pit the government against persons asserting private
rights. The federalism decisions outlined in Table 9 are less obviously relevant to individ-
ual rights because such decisions focus on the balance of federal and state authority. Nev-
ertheless, in such cases the practical effect of voting for the state is to deny federal relief to
a party alleging state encroachment upon his rights.
7. Jurisdictional questions (Tbl. 8), which exhibit the relative propensity of the Jus-
tices to avoid judicial decisions, are perhaps the most direct statistical evidence of the exer-
cise of judicial restraint. Other tables included in this study, however, also provide some
reading of the individual Justices' (and the Court's) positions on the "judicial restraint/
judicial activism" axis. Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference to the policy-
making branches of government, adherence to precedent, avoidance of constitutional bases
of decision when narrower grounds exist, respect for the Framers' intent when construing
constitutional text, and avoidance of issues rendered unnecessary by the doctrines of ripe-
ness, mootness, political questions, etc. As a result, a vote in favor of individual rights
claims (Tbls. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) may provide some indication of "judicial activism" because judi-
cial recognition of individual rights often requires the Court to overturn precedent or in-
validate an existing statute. Federalism issues (Tbl. 9) are also relevant because judicial
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From the voting patterns that emerge, we attempt to determine
whether individual Justices and the Court are taking "conservative" or
"liberal" positions.8 For the purposes of this study, we classify as con-
servative a vote favoring the government against an individual, a vote
against a claim of constitutional or statutory rights, a vote against the
exercise of jurisdiction, or a vote favoring state, as opposed to federal,
authority on federalism questions. We classify as liberal al contrary
votes.
This analytical scheme, of course, is not perfect. Unanimous deci-
sions (a significant portion of "all cases" decided by the Court) are
included in this study even though liberal or conservative ideology
may not have influenced the outcome of such cases.9 Concern for in-
dividual rights, furthermore, is not always (or even necessarily) the
attitudinal opposite of judicial restraint.10 In other cases, particular
circumstances may create a reversal in the expected relationship; for
example, liberals voting against and conservatives in favor of a claim
of individual rights. Such events may have occurred several times this
Term."
restraint is traditionally identified with respect for the role of the states within the federal
system.
8. We are mindful of the limited validity of the "conservative" and "liberal" labels.
As one noted federal jurist has commented:
All that I think can be justly said about the utility of applying overworked labels
to judges is that they are appropriate to some judges on some issues some of the
time. But to use them as generic descriptions characterizing judges on supposedly
major points of difference exaggerates the extent to which they may fairly apply.
FRANK M. CoFmiN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLEMrIONs FROM TE FEDERAL APPEL-
LATE BENcH 201 (1980).
9. When an opinion is issued by a unanimous Court, it is often true that either the
law or the facts, or both, pointed so clearly in one direction that ideology was not a deci-
sional factor. Several ostensibly unanimous decisions this Term, however, nevertheless
demonstrated substantial ideological discord. E.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647
(1994) (unanimously rejecting a claimed violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
but splitting as to the controlling rationale); Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431
(1994) (producing three separate opinions suggesting different approaches to the issue
whether an exception to the hearsay rule applies); Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350
(1994) (unanimously rejecting a claimed Miranda violation, but with Court splitting five-to-
four on the governing rationale).
10. For example, if existing precedent grants extensive protection to individual rights,
a Justice who resists efforts to undermine that precedent (a conservative trait) is exercising
restraint and also acting to preserve individual rights (a liberal result).
11. E.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (the Court's
three leading liberals, Blackmun, Souter, and Stevens, join with Kennedy and Rehnquist to
reject a First Amendment claim); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (conserva-
tive Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist (C.J.), Scalia, and Thomas voted in favor of
Fifth Amendment claim disfavored by the liberal wing of the Court); MCI Telecom. Corp.
v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. 2223 (1994) (the Court's most liberal members, Blackmun, Souter, and
Nevertheless, the basic assumption that undergirds this study-
that the individual Justices' and the Court's general orientation to in-
dividual rights and judicial restraint is suggestive of liberal or con-
servative ideology-appears generally sound.12 Furthermore, to the
extent that this assumption accurately reflects the proposed ideologi-
cal tendencies, one can identify trends by tracking the votes of the
Justices and the Court on Tables 1 through 10.
The individual votes cast can be compared with those of other
Justices for any given year to discern ideological positions within the
Court. Determination of the current ideological position of the Court
as a whole, however, requires comparisons over time. For the present
analysis, the best available baseline is the comparable data generated
for the five prior Terms (1987-1992). In the tables, this information
appears in the form of percentages for each Justice and, in all but the
Swing-Vote Table (Tbl. 10), for the Court majority. Figures I through
10 also graphically demonstrate the voting trends of the Court major-
ity in all cases, including the voting trends of the Court in unanimous
and split decisions.
This year, for the first time since the inception of this study, we
included a regression analysis for all the Justices who have been mem-
bers of the Supreme Court since 1987: Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, O'Connor, Blackmun, Kennedy and Stevens. The re-
maining three Justices have not been on the Court long enough to
perform a reliable regression analysis.13 This analysis, drawn from our
data for the 1987 through 1992 Terms and presented in Appendix B as
Tables la through 10a, yields predicted 1993 Justice-by-Justice voting
Stevens, voted in favor of a federal agency's invocation of regulatory power rejected by the
remainder of the Court); Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994) (Blackmun and
Stevens, alone in dissent, voted in favor of the federal government in a criminal gun con-
trol prosecution arguing against a scienter requirement in a criminal prosecution); NLRB
v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994) (liberal wing of the
Court, Blackmun, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, voted in favor of agency regulation while
conservative Justices voted against the federal government).
12. Deference to legislatures frequently means rejection of an individual's claim, espe-
cially one predicated upon the impropriety of governmental action. Emphasis upon the
Framers' intent is often associated with a reluctance to read new individual rights into the
Constitution. Refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction leaves the matter to state courts with
their possible bias in favor of actions by state governments, and is a clear rebuff to the
claimant seeking federal vindication of rights.
13. Even the regression analysis for Justices Rehnquist (CJ.), Scalia, O'Connor,
Blackmun, Kennedy, and Stevens may be of limited value because the data includes only
the 1987 to 1992 Terms. As a result, the readings of statistical significance generated by
regression analysis may not be entirely reliable.
winter 19951 SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
274 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:269
percentages (p(v)) for each table.14 These predicted values can be
compared with a Justice's (and the Court's) actual voting percentages
(a(v)). Ideological reorientation may be indicated where an individ-
ual Justice's (or the Court's) actual voting rates differ from the pre-
dicted values, particularly if the difference between the two figures is
statistically significant.15
Such data must be interpreted with caution because the percent-
ages on each Table are affected not only by the behavior of the indi-
vidual Justices, but also by the factual and legal nature of the cases
decided in a given Term. Although our regression analysis is designed
14. Each Justice's, and the Court's, voting percentages were plotted on a graph by
year. From those figures the value of p(v) was determined by the following equation:
p(v)= a + b(x)
where a represents the y intercept, b the slope, and x the value of a particular
Term. MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK, APPLIED REGREsSION: AN INTRoDuCGFON 9-10,
17-20 (1980).
15. The confidence interval of p(v) was determined by the following equations:
C = p(v) 2(SE)-for 95% confidence
C = p(v) 3(SE)-for 99% confidence
where p(v) represents the predicted value and SE the standard error. Id. at 13, 19-20, 30-
31, 53-54. The confidence interval is important to the reader because it determines the
range in which a Justice's, or the Court's, actual 1993 Term voting percentage (a(v)) can
deviate from their predicted 1993 Term voting percentage (p(v)) and still not be statisti-
cally significant. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBmn.* , ECONOMIC MODELS AND
ECONOMIC FORECASTS, 36-40 (2d ed. 1981). Where the difference between a Justice's pre-
dicted value and actual value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of confidence
(marked with a "*" in the "Sgnf." column in Appendix B), it can be said with 95% confi-
dence that the shift was due to a change from one year to the next, and not a random
fiuxuation. Id. Where the difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level of confi-
dence (marked with a "**" in the "Sgnf." column in Appendix B), such conclusions can be
made with a 99% confidence. Id
In addition, the Durbin-Watson test was used to determine the occurrence of auto-
correlation which, if present, systematically biases the standard error of the equation.
When auto-correlation exists it can lead to a smaller error variance estimate than is actu-
ally present. Id. at 152. Thus, for our study, auto-correlation occurs when the errors of one
point on the graph "carry over into future time periods." Id. The result is that the analysis
produces a smaller estimate of error than is actually true. Id at 153-54. Where auto-
correlation exists in this study, it places in question the statistical significance of a given
shift. Therefore, such occurrences shall be noted and the reader is cautioned that the sta-
tistical significance of the shift may be a result of a biased standard error. This bias can
lead to the false conclusion that the difference between a predicted value and an actual
value is statistically significant. When there is no auto-correlation present, the Durbin-
Watson statistic, which varies between zero and four, will be close to two. Values signifi-
cantly above or below two indicate auto-correlation. While more precise calculations can
be made, a generally accepted rule is that Durbin-Watson values less than one or greater
than three indicate auto-correlation. Id. at 158-61. This general rule is used in evaluating
the equations contained in Tables la through 10a which are set out fully in Appendix B. If
the Durbin-Watson test falls into an unacceptable range, it will be noted and considered in
interpreting the meaning of any test of statistical significance.
to increase reliability, statistics remain a blunt analytical tool for prob-
ing the mysteries of judicial decisionmaking. Percentage changes
from Term to Term may not necessarily reflect changes in the ideolog-
ical orientation of an individual Justice or the Court majority.16 How-
ever, directional changes across a number of Tables, particularly when
those shifts are statistically significant, strengthen the hypothesis that
a genuine shift in attitude has occurred.
17
i. The Voting Record
We turn now to a detailed examination of individual voting
behavior.
TABLE 1
CIVIL CASES: STATE GOVERNMENT
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY
JUSTICE 1993 TERM VOTES % VOTES FOR GOVERNMENT
FOR AGAINST 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
GOV'T GOV'T TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Rehnquist 15 7 68.18 52.8 71.4 84.0 70.3 66.7
Scalia 11 11 50.00 41.7 64.3 64.0 64.9 59.2
Souter 10 12 45.45 36.4 52.5 63.6 - -
Thomas 10 12 45.45 41.7 71.4 - - -
Blaclanun 9 12 42.86 30.3 35.7 24.0 43.2 30.6
Ginsburg 9 13 40.91 - - - - -
Kennedy 9 13 40.91 41.7 42.9 76.0 61.1 57.1
O'Connor 9 13 40.91 50.0 50.0 68.0 67.6 57.4
Stevens 6 16 27.27 31.3 29.3 36.0 40.5 35.4
Majority
All Cases 9 13 40.91 41.7 52.4 64.0 51.4 51.0
Split
Decisions 6 7 46.15 44.4 51.6 68.8 52.4 64.0
Unanimous 3 6 33.33 38.9 54.6 55.6 50.0 50.0
16. For example, a vote to uphold a greater percentage of criminal convictions than in
a previous Term may mean that the Justices or the Court has become tougher on criminal
defendants. Alternatively, such a statistical record may mean only that the facts, the law,
or both of a number of individual cases were less favorable to the defendant this Term than
in previous years.
17. Although factual and legal variations may skew analysis of a given category of
cases (producing unexpectedly liberal or conservative results), it is less likely that such
factors would account for a pronounced directional change in several tables.
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Table 118 and Figure I show that the Court's overall voting pat-
tern in 1993 continued a trend that began in 1991: the decision of
18. Cases decided in favor of state government: Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994)
(refusing to extend § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to challenges to the size of a
governing authority); Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994) (holding that a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 plaintiff who alleges unconstitutional imprisonment must establish that the underly-
ing conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid, or rendered suspect by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus); Bar-
clay Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994) (upholding California's use of a
"worldwide combined reporting" method to determine corporate franchise tax of foreign
multinational corporations); Department of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 114
S. Ct. 2028 (1994) (determining that bookkeeping requirements and quantity limitations
imposed by New York on wholesalers who sell untaxed cigarettes to Native Americans
were not preempted by federal law); Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994) (plurality
opinion) (stating that the Connick test-used to determine whether a government em-
ployee's speech is protected-applies to what public employer reasonably believed the em-
ployee said rather than what a fact finder determines actually was said); Northwest
Airlines v. County of Kent, 114 S. Ct. 855 (1994) (finding that county airport's user fees did
not violate the Anti-Head Tax Act or the Commerce Clause); Department of Revenue v.
ACF Indus., 114 S. Ct. 843 (1994) (approving Oregon ad valorem tax imposed upon rail-
road property despite the fact that the taxing scheme exempted many other classes of com-
mercial and industrial property); Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994) (deciding that
criminal prosecution pursuant to invalid arrest warrant does not violate due process
guarantees).
Cases decided against state government: Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481
(1994) (ruling that a New York school district comprising exclusively a religious village
violates the Establishment Clause); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (con-
cluding that the city had not met its burden of establishing that easements required of
landowner in exchange for building permit were reasonably related to the proposed con-
struction); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994) (invalidating, under
the Commerce Clause, a Massachusetts assessment on all fluid milk sold to retailers within
the state); Ibaflez v. Florida Dep't of Business and Professional Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084
(1994) (rejecting, as violating the First Amendment, a Florida Board of Accountancy deci-
sion to censure attorney for using the designations CPA and CFP in her advertising);
Lividas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2068 (1994) (holding that National Labor Relations Act
preempted State Labor Commissioner's policy of not enforcing an immediate payment
statute on behalf of employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement containing an
arbitration clause); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994) (invalidating city ordi-
nance banning all residential signs except those falling within one of ten exemptions con-
tained in the ordinance); Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 114 S. Ct. 1815 (1994)
(determining that Missouri "use tax" violated the Commerce Clause in those localities
where it exceeded the local sales tax); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S.
Ct. 1677 (1994) (using Commerce Clause to strike down local ordinance requiring that all
solid waste be processed at town's transfer station); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S.
Ct. 1419 (1994) (ruling that a state cannot exercise peremptory challenges solely on the
basis of the potential juror's gender); Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality,
114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994) (finding an Oregon surcharge on the disposal of solid waste gener-
ated in other states facially invalid under the negative Commerce Clause); Elder v. Hollo-
way, 114 S. Ct. 1019 (1994) (holding that courts are not bound by the authorities cited to it
when deciding whether a right is "clearly established" for purposes of qualified immunity);
Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993) (allowing reimbursement
to parents who remove their child from a public school that fails to provide an adequate
Wiinter 19951
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fewer and fewer civil cases in favor of state government. The percent-
age of cases decided unanimously in favor of state government in
1993, 33.3%, is the lowest figure since the inception of this study.
Moreover, the meager number of unanimous decisions in favor of
state government is statistically significant.19 Regression analysis (see
App. B, Tbl. la) predicts that the Court would have decided 50.4% of
all cases unanimously in favor of state litigants. The actual percentage
of cases so decided, 33.3%, 17.1% below the predicted value, is signifi-
cant to the 0.05 level of confidence and suggests that the Court has, in
fact, moved in a liberal direction since 1990 (Figure 1).
The significant movement in the decision of unanimous cases is
also reflected in the decision of "all cases" and "split decisions" cate-
gories. Although the 1993 "all cases" figure of 40.9% does not di-
verge in a statistically significant fashion from the predicted 1993
value of 48.7% (App. B, Tbl. la), the number is consistent with the
constant downward trend that began in 1991. Indeed, between the
1990 Term and the present, the percentage of "all cases" decided in
favor of state government has decreased by a total of 22.1 percentage
points. A similar trend is seen in the outcome of split decisions. In
1990 68.8% of the split decisions were decided in favor the states. In
contrast, only 46.2% of the split decisions were so decided in 1993.
Chief Justice Rehnquist-as he has done every year since this
survey's inception-tops Table 1 as the Justice most likely to vote in
favor of state government in civil cases. The Chief Justice's record of
voting for state government on 68.2% of the issues presented this
Term represents an increase of 15.4 percentage points over his 1992
Term record. More notable, however, is the position of the Chief Jus-
tice relative to the other Justices. Not only does he outdistance the
next closest Justice, Justice Scalia, by almost 20 percentage points, he
stands as the only Justice to vote in favor of state government more
than half of the time. At the table's other extreme is Justice Stevens,
who voted for state government only 27.3% of the time. His 4.0 per-
centage point decrease from last Term, however, is unremarkable.
The remaining seven Justices-who are spread out over a span of
less than 10%-are separated by votes in only two cases. Because of
this small point spread, it is unlikely that these statistics have any ideo-
education under Individual with Disabilities Education Act in favor of enrolling their child
in a private school that, while proper under IDEA, does not meet all the requirements of
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)).
19. The significance of the above data, however, should not be overstated. The
Durbin-Watson value ('DW) of 0.97 for the unanimous decision outcome on Table la sug-
gests possible auto-correlation. See supra note 15.
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logical value. Justice Scalia, second only to the Chief Justice in his
pro-state voting record, voted for state government on 50% of the
issues presented during the 1993 Term-an 8.3 percentage point in-
crease over the 1992 Term. Justice Souter and Justice Thomas tied for
third place, each voting for state government on 45.5% of the issues
addressed. Justice Blackmun, in fifth place, voted in favor of state
government 42.9% of the time-a 12.6 percentage point increase from
the 1992 Term. Tied in sixth place are Justices Ginsburg,20 Kennedy
and O'Connor, who each voted in favor of state government 40.9% of
the time. None of these voting percentages deviates in a statistically
significant manner from predicted values (App. B, Thl. la).
TABLE 2
CIVIL CASES: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY
JusTIcE 1993 TERM VoTms % VOTEs FOR GOVERNMENT
FOR AOAiNST 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
GOV'T GOV'T TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Souter 13 4 76.47 70.0 71.4 55.6 - -
Stevens 12 5 70.59 34.4 57.1 40.0 57.1 42.9
Blacmun 11 5 68.75 48.5 57.1 60.0 64.3 60.7
Ginsburg 10 7 58.82 - - - - -
Rehnquist 10 7 58.82 74.2 71.4 70.0 78.6 71.4
O'Connor 9 7 56.25 62.5 52.4 60.0 60.7 60.7
Kennedy 9 8 52.94 70.0 76.2 55.6 60.7 66.7
Scalia 9 8 52.94 67.7 71.4 57.9 60.7 59.3
Thomas 8 9 47.06 64.5 53.3 - -
Majority
All Cases 9 8 52.94 66.7 81.0 60.0 71.4 64.3
split
Decisions 3 4 42.86 76.5 83.3 60.0 66.7 66.7
Unanimous 6 4 60.00 56.3 77.8 60.0 76.9 61.5
20. Although it is impossible to ascertain any "movement" by Justice Ginsburg, since
she has been on the Court only one Term, she ended the 1993 Term one position from the
bottom of Table 1. By contrast, her predecessor, Justice White, was second only to the
Chief Justice during the 1992 Term. Justice Ginsburg's voting record, therefore, has un-
doubtedly contributed to the overall liberal trend of the whole Court noted in Table 1.
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Table 221 exhibits a sizeable decrease in the total percentage of
civil cases decided in favor of the federal government, from 66.7%
during the 1992 Term to 52.9% in 1993. The movement is even
greater when one regards the Court's record in close cases. Split deci-
sions, in which ideology may play a greater role than in cases decided
by a unanimous Court, were decided in favor of the federal govern-
ment one-third less often during the 1993 Term than during the 1992
Term. In fact, the 1993 Term's results, both overall and in split deci-
sions, represent the lowest percentage of civil cases decided in favor of
the federal government during the nine years of this study.
21. Cases holding in favor of the federal government: Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994) (affirming a Secretary of Health and Human Services deci-
sion barring a hospital from recovering certain educational costs borne in prior years by its
affiliated medical college); United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994) (refusing to find
a due process violation in the retroactive application of a federal estate tax amendment);
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994) (declining to allow the award of
attorney's fees to private litigants who bring a cost recovery action under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980); BFP v. Resolu-
tion Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994) (holding that the price received in a mortgage
foreclosure sale qualifies as a "reasonably equivalent value" of mortgage property for
bankruptcy purposes); United States v. Irvine, 114 S. Ct. 1473 (1994) (holding that the
disclaimer of a remainder interest in a trust was subject to gift tax after enactment of fed-
eral gift tax statute); FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996 (1994) (refusing to extend Bivens
rationale to actions against a federal agency); ABF Freight Sys. v. NLRB, 114 S. Ct. 835
(1994) (ratifying NLRB order to reinstate employee, despite the fact that the employee
lied to an Administrative Law Judge about his reasons for not complying with job-related
responsibilities); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993)
(refusing to permit the dismissal of a forfeiture action which was not filed in compliance
with the timing requirements of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-04).
Cases holding against the federal government: Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (vacating the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the U.S. and remanding for inquiry into factual basis of government's assertions); Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S. Ct. 2251 (1994)
(invalidating "true doubt rule" applied by Department of Labor authorities because it vio-
lates the Administrative Procedure Act by shifting the burden of proof to the party oppos-
ing a benefits claim); MCI Telecom. Corp. v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. 2223 (1994) (finding that an
FCC policy de-tariffing nondominant long distance carriers exceeded the Commission's
authority); O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994) (recognizing that Califor-
nia law, rather than federal law, governs the tort liability of attorneys who counseled now-
failed savings and loan); Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) (holding that the "de-
liberate indifference" standard under the Eighth Amendment is met when a defendant
disregards a substantial risk of serious harm); NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.
of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994) (striking down the NLRB's test for assessing whether nurses
are supervisors under NLRA); FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996 (1994) (holding that the sue-
and-be-sued clause applicable to Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation is not
limited to cases in which it would be subject to liability as a private entity as provided by
the jurisdictional grant of the Federal Tort Claims Act); United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) (establishing that under most circumstances the
government is required to afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before
seizing real property pursuant to civil forfeiture laws).
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The importance of the above movement is supported by the re-
gression analysis, which shows that both the 13.8 percentage point
drop in the "all cases" category and the 33.6 percentage point de-
crease in the split decisions category decided in favor of the federal
government are statistically significant. Indeed, the decrease in the
federal government's success rate in split decisions is significant to the
0.01 level of confidence (App. B, Thl. 2a). Thus, the Court is moving
in a liberal direction in favoring private litigants over the federal
government.
Table 2 reveals another interesting fact. The liberal faction is
headed by Justices Thomas and Scalia, hardly known for liberal polit-
ical ideology, while the most conservative positions on Table 2 are
held by none other that Justices Souter, Stevens, and Blackmun, none
of whom is viewed to embrace politically conservative ideologies.
This unusual pattern arguably presents some uncertainty in the valid-
ity of this study's underlying assumptions and its corresponding con-
clusions. Why are Justices who are traditionally considered politically
liberal voting in favor of the federal government while politically con-
servative jurists are doing the opposite? Before attempting an answer,
we will examine the voting patterns of the individual Justices.
Three Justices voted in favor of the federal government a greater
percentage of the time during the 1993 Term than during the 1992
Term. Justice Souter voted in favor of the federal government 76.5%
of the time, an increase of 6.5 percentage points over the 1992 Term.
Perhaps the most notable movements on the table, however, are those
shown by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, who substantially increased
the number of cases in which they voted for the government. Justice
Stevens, who ended up in the table's second position, voted in favor of
the government 70.6% of the time-more than a twofold increase
over his percentage last Term of 34.4 (the lowest position on Table 2 in
1992). Justice Blackmun, in the third position, voted in favor of the
government 68.8% of the time, rising 20.3 percentage points. In fact,
the movements evidenced by both of these Justices are statistically
significant-in the case of Justice Stevens, to the 0.01 level of confi-
dence (App. B, Thl. 2a).
The other statistically significant movements revealed by Table 2
are the voting records of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ken-
nedy and Scalia.' These Justices all voted for the federal government
22. Those Justices whose movements could not be adjudged statistically significant are
arranged as follows: Justice Ginsburg is tied with the Chief Justice for the middle position
on Table 2, each voting for the federal government 58.8% of the time. Next is Justice
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in substantially fewer cases than previous years' data predicted. The
Chief Justice's actual record of 58.8%, 17.8 percentage points below
his predicted value, and Justice Scalia's actual record of 52.9%, 16.3
percentage points below his predicted value, are statistically signifi-
cant to the 0.01 level of confidence. Justice Kennedy's record, which
shows he voted for the federal government nearly 20 percentage
points less often than his past record would predict, shows liberal
movement that is significant to the 0.05 level of confidence.
But, what do these changes mean? The above data suggest that
the Court's members are reorienting themselves to new political reali-
ties. As these adjustments occur, voting patterns will change.
During the first eight years of this study, a Republican President
occupied the White House and, consequently, a Republican Solicitor
General was responsible for initiating governmental appeals to the
Supreme Court. In January 1993, however, Democrat William Jeffer-
son Clinton was inaugurated as the forty-second President of the
United States. With the ascendancy of the new president, Republican
Solicitor General Kenneth Starr was excused from office and Demo-
crat Drew S. Days III was installed as the new Solicitor General. One
can safely assume that Mr. Days has taken more politically liberal po-
sitions than his immediate predecessors. Are the results on Table 2,
then, nothing more than instrumental reactions to the shift in the na-
ture of the cases being pursued by the Solicitor General-with the
liberals favoring politically liberal policies and the conservatives op-
posing them?
This theory can be tested by analyzing the civil cases involving
the federal government decided during the 1993 Term. We will limit
our inquiry to cases decided by a divided Court because unanimous
decisions are generally decided on non-ideological grounds. There
were a total of seven such cases during the 1993 Term.2 3
O'Connor, who voted in favor of the federal government 56.3% of the time during the
1993 Term, down from the 62.5% she voted during the 1992 Term. Justice Thomas voted
for the government on a mere 47.1% of the issues which he decided in the 1993 Term; this
results in a 16.2 percentage point drop from his percentage of 64.5 during the previous
Term.
23. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994); Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S. Ct. 2251 (1994); MCI
Telecom. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2223 (1994); Key Tronic Corp. v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994); NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am.,
114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994); United States
v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
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Of these seven cases, four were appealed by the Solicitor General
on behalf of the federal government.2 In these four cases, Justices
Blackmun, Souter and Stevens sided with the federal government on
every issue but one.25 They were in the majority once,26 dissented
three times,27 and in one of those dissents the group was joined by
Justice Ginsburg.2t In the same four cases, however, the traditionally
conservative wing of the Court, comprising Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas, sided with the federal government
only once.29
From the above data, it appears that the federal government
pressed more liberal claims in 1993 than in the recent past. Based on
this inference, it can then be argued that Table 2 merely demonstrates
that a politically conservative Court voted against a politically liberal
executive department. This explanation, of course, creates some ana-
lytical difficulties for this study. We have posited that a vote in favor
of government is conservative while a contrary vote is liberal. Those
who chafe at the thought of attaching the adjective liberal to Justice
Scalia, therefore, might assert that Table 2 undercuts the foundation
of that analysis: the "true" liberals, the argument would go, are now
voting with the government while the "true" conservatives are voting
against it.
Such an objection, while not without force, does not undercut the
validity of this study. While we acknowledge the inherent limitations
24. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S. Ct. at 2251; MCI Telecom. Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2223;
Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. at 1778; James Daniel Good Real Prop-
erty, 114 S. Ct. at 492.
25. The one issue on which the three Justices held against the interest of the United
States was found in James Daniel. In that case, the Justices joined a majority opinion which
held that the government's ex parte seizure of the defendant's real property violated due
process. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 505. On the second issue ad-
dressed in the case, the three Justices, with the unanimous accord of the Court, voted to
reverse the lower court's ruling to dismiss the case for failing to comply with the internal
timing requirements of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1604 but was filed within the five-year statute of
limitations. Id. at 507.
26. Id at 492.
27. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S. Ct. at 2259 (Souter, J., dissenting); MCI Telecom.
Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2233 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am.,
114 S. Ct. at 1785 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
28. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. at 1785 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
29. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 507 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Id. at 515 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas also sided with the government in the
unanimous half of the Court's opinion in James Daniel. Id. at 497-98 and 505-07 (respec-
tively). See supra note 25.
of any statistical study of judicial attitude,30 we are sensitive to the
ambiguities inherent in any use of ideological labels, 31 and would not
argue that Justices Scalia or Thomas suddenly became "born-again"
liberal Democrats. The use of the liberal and conservative appella-
tions in this study is not synonymous with the use of those terms in
ordinary politics. Rather, we posit that a liberal jurist will generally
prefer a claim of individual right over an assertion of government
power, while the conservative reaction will be the opposite. We be-
lieve these assumptions remain sound even when ideological roles are
reversed, as they may be on the present Court.
When government pursues a politically conservative agenda,
ideologically sympathetic members of the Court, for example, Justices
Scalia and Thomas, may align themselves with the government and
vote in its favor-a conservative judicial embrace of conservative poli-
tics. Similarly, liberal Justices unsympathetic to such political goals.
For example, Justices Blackmun and Stevens, might choose to vote
against the government-a liberal reaction to conservative politics. In
neither of these instances are there serious quibbles with the use of
the conservative or liberal tags, perhaps because the use of those la-
bels accords with ordinary political usage: the conservative Justices, in
the example posited, favor conservative policies while the liberal Jus-
tices favor liberal policies. However, this is not the sense in which we
use the ideological labels. Under the definitional stance of this study,
the "conservative" Justice is conservative because he or she supports
the assertion of governmental power, while the "liberal" opposes it.
This use of the conservative and liberal labels remains valid even
when political roles are reversed. Thus, when a politically liberal ju-
rist embraces liberal politics to uphold an assertion of governmental
power, that action is properly denominated conservative. Similarly,
when a politically conservative jurist rejects some new assertion of
governmental regulatory power, that action is appropriately described
as liberal. In both circumstances, the conservative supports the asser-
tion of government power while the liberal opposes it.32
30. Any assertion that statistics measure attitudinal changes on the Court is problem-
atic. There appears to be no real way to measure the attitudes of the Justices, or to deter-
mine whether vote change or attitude change is the independent variable. The formal
nature of the Justices' positions does not allow for the usual methods of measuring attitude
as the independent variable (for example, surveys or interviews). Thus, we are left to mea-
sure changes in voting patterns and then infer possible causes from those patterns.
31. See CoFFIN, supra note 8.
32. See infra table 5, notes 43-55, and accompanying text (noting Justice Blackmun's
and Justice Stevens' retreat from-and Justice Scalia's and Justice Thomas' embrace of-
the First Amendment).
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Therefore, Table 2 does not demonstrate that the Justices have
radically changed their political ideologies. Rather, as federal govern-
mental politics have shifted, the conservative and liberal roles on the
Supreme Court have also shifted. Table 2 accurately reflects that the
Supreme Court is somewhat more liberal in 1993 than it was in 1990.
The liberal flag may simply be passing from politically liberal jurists
who opposed politically conservative agendas to the hands of politi-
cally conservative Justices who, in the same manner, now oppose po-
litically liberal invocations of governmental control. When Justice
Scalia voted against an exercise of governmental power in 1994,33 it
was no more paradoxical to attach a liberal label to his action than it
was, in 1973, to attach the same label to Justice Blackmun. 4
TABLE 3
STATE CRMINAL CASES
JUSTICE 1993 TERM VOTES % VOTEs FOR GovERNMENT
FOR AGAINST 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
GOV'T GOV'T TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Thomas 14 2 87.50 85.7 75.0 - - -
Rehnquist 13 3 81.25 90.0 66.7 81.5 85.3 85.2
Scalia 13 3 81.25 86.4 77.8 74.1 73.5 77.8
O'Connor 11 5 68.75 66.7 33.3 66.7 76.5 77.8
Kennedy 8 8 50.00 77.3 50.0 57.7 73.5 81.5
Ginsburg 7 9 43.75 - - - - -
Souter 4 12 25.00 55.0 55.6 68.0 -
Stevens 4 12 25.00 31.8 27.8 0.0 20.6 37.0
Blackmun 2 14 12.50 25.0 33.3 14.8 35.3 37.0
Majority
Afl Cases 9 7 56.25 77.3 44.4 55.6 64.7 70.4
Split
Decisions 8 5 61.54 84.6 33.3 68.2 70.0 72.7
Unanimous 1 2 33.33 66.7 66.7 0.0 25.0 60.0
33. E.g., MCI Telecom. Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2226; Greenwich Collieries, 114 S. Ct. at
2253.
34. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Blackmun delivered the opisiion of the
Court establishing the right to abortion under certain circumstances).
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Table 335 illustrates that the 1993 Court voted in favor of state
criminal convictions less frequently than the 1992 Court. The 1993
Court voted to uphold state criminal convictions 56.3% of the time in
1993 as opposed to 77.3% in 1992. This 21 percentage point drop is
notable, moreover, because it results from decreases in the frequency
of state success in both split decisions and unanimous cases. In fact,
states were successful in unanimous cases only half as frequently in
the 1993 Term36 as they were during the 1992 Term.37 Whether Table
3 represents any general liberal trend, however, is questionable. Fig-
ure 3 shows that voting patterns in state criminal cases have been
rather volatile, and regression analysis indicates that none of the
35. Cases decided in favor of state government: Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630
(1994) (upholding California death penalty statute against allegations that it is unconstitu-
tionally vague); Reed v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 2291 (1994) (holding that a court's failure to
abide by speedy trial requirement was not cognizable under federal habeas statute when
petitioner did not object to trial date at time of trial and suffered no prejudice from delay);
Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994) (refusing to require that a jury be in-
structed that a life term without parole is the alternative to the death penalty unless the
state puts a defendant's future dangerousness in issue); Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct.
2004 (1994) (deciding that the admission of evidence concerning petitioner's prior death
sentence did not violate the Constitution); Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) (find-
ing that Nebraska definition of "reasonable doubt" passes constitutional muster); Hagen v.
Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994) (finding that the location of a crime committed by petitioner
was not "Indian Country" therefore the state could permissibly exercise jurisdiction over
the petitioner); Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 S. Ct. 948 (1994) (reversing a Court of Appeals
decision granting habeas relief because the court's holding constituted a new rule under
Teague nonretroactivity principal); Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994) (refusing to va-
cate death sentence and rejecting argument that petitioner's sentencing hearing violated
double jeopardy clause).
Cases decided against state government: McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994)
(concluding that the statutory right to counsel for capital defendants in federal habeas
proceedings adheres prior to the filing of a habeas petition); Simmons v. South Carolina,
114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994) (ruling that since the state raised the issue of petitioner's future
dangerousness, petitioner should have been allowed to inform the jury that a sentence of
life imprisonment carried no possibility of parole); Department of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) (determining that a tax imposed under the Montana Danger-
ous Drug Tax Act can qualify as a "second punishment" for purposes of the double jeop-
ardy clause); Stansbury v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1526 (1994) (establishing that an officer's
subjective view of whether a person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the
determination of whether a person is in custody for the purposes of Miranda); Powell v.
Nevada, 114 S. Ct. 1280 (1994) (holding that the McLaughlin rule, which states that a 48-
hour delay between a warrantless arrest and a probable cause hearing violates the Consti-
tution, is to be applied retroactively); Burden v. Zant, 114 S. Ct. 654 (1994) (reversing and
remanding denial of habeas petition for inquiry into possible conflict of interest involving
petitioner's pretrial counsel).
36. Since only three decisions rendered during the 1993 Term fit this classification, the
importance of this finding is dubious.
37. In split decisions, the states won 61.5% of the time during the 1993 Term as op-
posed to 84.6% of the time during the 1992 Term, a decrease of 23.1 percentage points.
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movement in the 1993 Term is statistically significant. Consequently,
the general decrease in support of state and local government claims is
likely due to the issues or types of cases presented before the Court
and not the result of attitudinal shifts.
The individual Justices maintained roughly the same relative posi-
tions on Table 3 during the 1993 Term that they occupied during the
1992 Term. Justice Thomas supplanted Chief Justice Rehnquist as the
Justice most likely to vote in favor of states in criminal cases, voting in
the state's favor 87.5% of the time. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Scalia tied for second, voting for the states on 81.2% of the issues
presented during this Term.38 These same three Justices occupied the
top three spots on last Term's table as well. In the fourth spot on the
table, 12.4 percentage points lower than the pair who tied for second,
is Justice O'Connor.39
Justice Kennedy immediately follows Justice O'Connor, although
nearly 20 percentage points separate the two Justices. For Justice
Kennedy, his 1993 record-voting 50% of the time in favor of the
states-is 27.3 percentage points lower than his 1992 Term percentage
of 77.3. Justice Ginsburg is next, voting for state governments 43.8%
of the time. Tying for seventh are Justices Souter and Stevens, each
voting in favor of states only 25% of the time. Justice Souter's record
during the 1993 Term is 30 percentage points lower than his 55% rate
during the 1992 Term. At the bottom of the table, in the same posi-
tion he occupied during the 1992 Term, is Justice Blackmun-who
voted in favor of the states only 12.5% of the time (half of his tally in
1992).
While none of the vote tallies noted above demonstrates statisti-
cally significant movement (see App. B, Thl. 3a), Table 3 does suggest
one interesting piece of information. The 20 percentage point gap be-
tween Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy separates the Justices
whose voting percentages changed very little between 1992 and 1993
from those Justices who were responsible for the overall 21 percent-
age point decline. The top four Justices on Table 3, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Scalia and O'Connor, averaged only
a 2.4 percentage point decrease from the 1992 Term to the 1993 Term.
38. For Chief Justice Rehnquist, this represents a decrease of 8.8 percentage points
from last Term while for Justice Scalia it represents a 5.4 percentage point fall.
39. Justice O'Connor's 68.8% record,.a 2.1 percentage point increase over the 1992
Term, makes her one of the two Justices who voted more frequently for the states this
Term than last. Justice Thomas was the other.
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The bottom five Justices, however, Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg,40 Sou-
ter, Stevens and Blackmun, averaged a decline of 21.6 percentage
points from last Term to this Term.
TABLE 4
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
JUSTICE 1993 TERM vOTES % VOTES FOR GOVERNMErr
FoR AGAINST 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
GOV'T GOV'T TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Rehnquist 10 2 83.33 81.3 76.9 70.0 77.8 88.9
Thomas 10 2 83.33 81.3 54.6- - - -
O'Connor 9 3 75.00 75.0 76.9 70.0 77.8 77.8
Kennedy 8 4 66.67 60.0 84.6 50.0 66.7 88.9
Scalia 8 4 66.67 62.5 76.9 40.0 66.7 66.7
Blackmun 7 5 58.33 46.7 61.5 70.0 44.4 55.6
Ginsburg 7 5 58.33 - - - -
Souter 7 5 58.33 43.8 69.2 75.0 - -
Stevens 6 6 50.00 26.7 38.5 60.0 33.3 66.7
Majority
All Cases 8 4 66.67 68.8 69.2 60.0 66.7 88.9
Split
Decisions 3 3 50.00 77.8 55.6 50.0 83.3 100.0
Unanimous 5 1 83.33 57.1 100.0 75.0 33.3 66.7
Table 441 sends mixed messages. The percentage of cases decided
unanimously in favor of the federal government increased from 57.1%
40. For comparative purposes, Justice Ginsburg's 1993 Term voting percentage was
compared with the 1992 voting percentage of the Justice whom she replaced, Justice White.
Justice White voted for the state 75.0% of the time during the 1992 Term. Richard G.
Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1, 244
(1992).
41. Cases decided in favor of the federal government: Shannon v. United States, 114 S.
Ct. 2419 (1994) (rejecting the contention that a defendant is entitled to have a jury be
informed of the consequences of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict); Davis v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (declining to extend the Edwards rule to circumstances where
a suspect's request for an attorney is ambiguous or equivocal); Nichols v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994) (allowing a defendant's previous uncounseled misdemeanor convic-
tion to be considered during sentencing for a subsequent offense, as long as the previous
conviction did not result in incarceration); Posters 'n' Things Ltd. v. United States, 114 S.
Ct. 1747 (1994) (construing 21 U.S.C. § 857(a)(1) to require the government to prove that a
defendant knowingly conveyed interstate commerce items that he knew were likely to be
used with illegal drugs and finding that § 857 is not unconstitutionally vague); Custis v.
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in 1992 to 83.3% in 1993. This, of course, suggests conservative move-
ment. If, however, one focuses on the outcome of split decisions-
where ideological concerns arguably loom larger than in unanimous
outcomes-the Court then appears to vote less often in favor of the
government: down 27.8 percentage points from the 1992 split decision
tally. This movement, particularly because it occurred in split deci-
sions, may suggest that the Court is advancing toward more liberal
outcomes in federal criminal cases.
Most likely, Table 4 does not symbolize any shift by the Court,
whether liberal or conservative. Figure 4 shows that the Court's vot-
ing record has been rather volatile in federal criminal cases. Regres-
sion analysis, furthermore, demonstrates that none of the percentage
changes in 1993 is statistically significant (App. B, Thl. 4a). Table 4, in
short, does not demonstrate a reliable trend.
Table 4, however, may indicate why the 1993 Court was arguably
more conservative in its decision of unanimous cases. In 1993, Justices
Stevens and Blackmun substantially increased their voting record in
favor of the federal government in criminal cases, with Justice Stevens
gaining 23.3 and Justice Blackmun adding 11.6 percentage points. Re-
gression analysis, moreover, indicates that these values, while not sta-
tistically significant, are nevertheless higher than either Justice
Stevens' or Justice Blackmun's prior performances would predict; in
the case of Justice Stevens by 26.3 percentage points and in the case of
Justice Blackmun by 10.4. Thus, the conservative movement demon-
strated by the Court's decision of unanimous cases this Term may not
United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994) (refusing to allow a defendant in a federal sentencing
proceeding to collaterally attack his previous state convictions, unless such convictions
were obtained in violation of the right to counsel); Beecham v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
1669 (1994) (concluding that defendants convicted under federal law must have their civil
rights restored under federal law in order to possess a firearm pursuant to exemption
granted in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)); Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994) (holding that
the "extrajudicial source" doctrine limits a judge's required recusal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a)); Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752 (1994) (rejecting several constitutional
challenges to a military court's authority to convict).
Cases decided against federal government: Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
2431 (1994) (refusing to extend the "inculpatory statement" exception to the hearsay rule
to statements that are not self-inculpatory); Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994)
(requiring the government to establish that a defendant knew the firearm's illegal charac-
ter in order to obtain a conviction under the National Firearms Act); United States v.
Granderson, 114 S. Ct. 1259 (1994) (defining the phrase "original sentence" in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3565(a) as the maximum prison term available under the sentencing guidelines); Ratzlaf
v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994) (interpreting 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) to require the
government prove the defendant knew that structuring financial transactions to avoid fed-
eral reporting requirements was illegal).
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come from politically conservative members, but from the more con-
servative voting records of the politically liberal wing of the Court.4'
As in last Term's survey, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas together occupy the top position on Table 4, voting for the
federal government 83.3% of the time and differing only slightly from
the mark of 81.3% achieved last Term. The Table's other extreme also
follows last Term's precedent, with Justice Stevens ranking last of the
nine Justices and voting for the government only 50% of the time.
Among those Justices in the middle, Justice O'Connor closely fol-
lows the pair in first place, voting for the federal government on 75%
of the issues presented. After Justice O'Connor are Justices Scalia
and Kennedy, who each voted for the government 66.7% of the time.
The trio of Justices Ginsburg, Souter and Blackmun tied for sixth with
a voting record of 58.3% in favor of the government.
Table 543 presents curious data. Overall, the chart totals appear
to demonstrate a noteworthy liberal shift: the Court increased its ac-
ceptance of First Amendment claims in all cases by some 12 percent-
age points and in split decisions by nearly 7 percentage points. In
unanimous decisions, moreover, the Court supported the First
Amendment in every case. The ranking of individual Justices on Ta-
ble 5, however, may be more noteworthy than the vote tallies for the
Court overall.
Justice Stevens, who last Term tied with Justice Blackmun for first
place on Table 5 voting for 90% of all First Amendment claims, ended
the 1993 Term only one vote away from the bottom of the chart. Jus-
tice Blackmun, for his part, sinks from the top of the Table to the
middle, favoring only a bare majority, 57.1%, of all First Amendment
claims presented. By contrast, Justices Scalia and Thomas, who in the
1992 Term ranked fifth and sixth respectively, tied for first place in
1993.
42. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is given in the discussion of Table 2,
in text accompanying notes 21-34, supra.
43. Cases decided in favor of the claim: Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S.
Ct. 2516 (1994) (holding that some provisions of injunction against anti-abortion protestors
unnecessarily burdened free speech in violation of the First Amendment); Ibafiez v. Flor-
ida Dep't of Business and Professional Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994); City of Ladue v.
Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
Cases decided against the claim: Madsen, 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (holding that the 36-
foot buffer zone around abortion clinic entrances and driveway, and noise restrictions, did
not violate First Amendment); Trner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445
(1994); Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
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TABLE 5
FIRST AMENDMENT IGHTS OF EXPRESSION,
ASSOCIATION, AND FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
JUSTICE 1993 TERM VOTES % VOTES FOR RIGHTS CLAIM
FOR AGAINST 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
CLAIM CLAIM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Scalia 6 1 85.71 45.5 37.5 25.0 26.7 35.3
Thomas 6 1 85.71 40.0 20.0 - - -
Ginsburg 5 2 71.43 - - - -
Blackmun 5 2 71.43 90.0 88.9 69.2 60.0 41.2
Kennedy 5 2 71.43 77.8 77.8 41.7 40.0 37.5
O'Connor 4 3 57.14 36.4 77.8 54.5 26.7 25.0
Souter 4 3 57.14 60.0 88.9 41.7 - -
Stevens 4 3 57.14 90.0 100.0 50.0 46.7 64.7
Rehnquist 3 4 42.86 36.4 50.0 16.7 13.3 18.8
Majority
All Cases 4 3 57.14 45.5 66.7 25.0 40.0 35.3
Split
Decisions 2 3 40.00 33.3 57.1 30.0 40.0 22.2
Unanimous 2 0 100.00 60.0 100.0 0.0 40.0 50.0
This role reversal can be traced to two cases: Turner Broadcasting
Systems, Inc. v. FCC44 and Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.45
These two cases, which together address three separate First Amend-
ment issues,46 arguably caused the Court, and the individual Justices,
to reorient themselves to a new political climate.
In Turner, cable television owners challenged sections four and
five of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, which requires cable companies to devote a portion of
their channels to local commercial and public broadcast stations.47
The Court voted five-to-four, with Justices Stevens and Blackmun
44. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
45. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
46. We divided Madsen into two separate issues. First, did the court's injunction creat-
ing a 36-foot buffer zone around the entrance to an abortion clinic and limiting noise vio-
late the First Amendment? ld. at 2530. Second, did the remainder of the injunction
violate the First Amendment? 1d. Although there were myriad other bases upon which we
could have divided the case, these two issues fully encompassed the different votes cast by
the Justices and at the same time retained some level of simplicity.
47. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2451.
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joining the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Souter, to reject
the cable owners' claim that the First Amendment required (almost
certainly fatal) strict scrutiny of the Act. 8
Madsen, for its part, pitted pro-life protestors' First Amendment
claims against the rights of women attempting to obtain abortions.4 9
By a six-to-three ° margin, the Court upheld a district court injunction
barring demonstrators from a thirty-six foot area surrounding an abor-
tion clinic entrance. The Court, however, by an eight-to-one margin,51
struck down the remaining portions of the injunction as violative of
the First Amendment.
The outcomes in Turner and Madsen largely account for the un-
expected individual rankings on Table 5. Contrary to prior predilec-
tions, Justice Stevens rejected all three First Amendment claims
presented (one in Turner and two in Madsen), while Justice Blackmun
rejected the First Amendment claim in Turner and accepted only one
of the two Madsen claims. Regression analysis, moreover, suggests
that the resulting voting percentages are unusual when considered in
light of prior patterns. Justice Stevens' comparatively low tolerance
for First Amendment claims is nearly 41 percentage points below his
predicted 1993 score (App. B, Thl. 5a). Similarly, Justice Blackmun's
1993 drop, while not meeting the rigorous standard for statistical sig-
nificance, nevertheless results in a First Amendment voting percent-
age some 24 percentage points below the outcome predicted by
regression analysis.
While Justices Stevens and Blackmun adopted a variety of
stances towards First Amendment claims, Justices Scalia and Thomas
became quite receptive to free speech concerns. Justice Scalia, in fact,
largely because of his votes in Turner and Madsen, increased his ac-
ceptance of First Amendment claims by some 40 percentage points.
This movement is statistically significant to the 0.01 level of confi-
48. Id. at 2469. The five-member majority, however, stopped short of actually uphold-
ing the Act. Instead, the majority sent the matter back to the district court to determine
whether the Act could survive intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 2472. The
dissenters, on the other hand, would have invalidated the "must carry" provisions of the
Act under strict First Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Id. at 2481 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
50. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Blackmun, Ginsburg, O'Connor, Souter, and
Stevens voted against the First Amendment claims. Justices Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas
voted in their favor.
51. Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter from this portion of the opinion. Id. at 2533.
dence52 (App. B, Thl. 5a). Justice Thomas' amenability to First
Amendment claims increased even more, rising by almost 46 percent-
age points. Justice Thomas' movement is not statistically significant
because he has not been on the Court long enough for us to perform a
plausible regression analysis.
These results are explainable by a single factor. We believe the
answer, as set out in the discussion of Table 2, is that the conservative
and liberal poles on the Court are shifting.53 As a politically liberal
federal government undertakes various actions, such as attempting to
promote "diversity" by regulating the content of broadcast speech54
and attempting to promote "autonomy" by limiting the free speech
rights of abortion protestors15 politically liberal Justices reasonably
can be expected to cast conservative votes while politically conserva-
tive jurists may be inclined to take the liberal, anti-government stance.
Table 5 demonstrates that the Court has been somewhat more
liberal on First Amendment claims than in the recent past. Addition-
ally, part of that increasing liberality is coming from such unexpected
quarters as Justices Scalia and Thomas.
Table 6 affords no real opportunity to assess statistically the
Court's movement on equal protection issues, because only one case
addressing an equal protection issue was decided by the Court during
the 1993 Term. That case, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,56 broadened
the application of gender under the Equal Protection Clause. In
J.E.B., the Court held, six to three (with the Chief Justice and Justices
Scalia and Thomas dissenting), that the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges on the basis of gender violates the Equal Protection Clause.57
Apart from the fact that the Court decided a qualitatively important
equal protection question, this single case imparts very little statistical
52. The Durbin-Watson value (DW) for this figure, however, is 0.76. This suggests
auto-correlation and possibly a biased standard of error value. Justice Scalia's increase is
so high from both his 1992 score and his predicted value, however, that any possible bias is
not likely to significantly undermine its statistical significance.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 21-34.
54. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and
Thomas, concluded that the must-carry portions of the Act "are content based [and] are an
impermissible restraint on the cable operators' editorial discretion as well as on the cable
programmers' speech." Turner Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2479 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2548 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that 36-foot buffer zone injunction could not withstand strict scrutiny under the
First Amendment).
56. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
57. Id. at 1422.
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TABLE 6
EQUAL PROTEC7ION CLAIMS
JUSTICE 1993 TERM VOTES % VoTES FoR Riolrrs CLAIM
FOR AGAINST 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
CLAIM CLAIM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Blackmun 1 0 100.00 40.0 50.0 83.3 0.0 60.0
Ginsburg 1 0 100.00 - - - -
Kennedy 1 0 100.00 20.0 50.0 42.9 25.0 57.1
O'Connor 1 0 100.00 40.0 33.3 28.6 25.0 66.7
Souter 1 0 100.00 40.0 50.0 50.0 - -
Stevens 1 0 100.00 40.0 66.7 83.3 0.0 66.7
Rehnquist 0 1 0.00 20.0 50.0 14.3 20.0 57.1
Scalia 0 1 0.00 20.0 33.3 14.3 25.0 57.1
Thomas 0 1 0.00 20.0 60.0 - - -
Majority
All Cases 1 0 100.00 20.0 50.0 42.9 0.0 57.1
Split
Decisions 1 0 100.00 33.3 50.0 50.0 0.0 100.0
Unanimous 0 0 0.00 0.0 50.0 33.3 0.0 50.0
data. We can only note (as could virtually anyone who reads J.E.B.)
that three generally conservative members of the Court disagreed
with a significant gender discrimination ruling.
The very dearth of equal protection cases this Term, however,
may have some significance. Various civil rights statutes now occupy
fields that previously might have been addressed under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.5" Some scholars have suggested that the Clause pro-
vides a difficult (and perhaps implausible) basis for judicial
intervention.5 9 Thus, apart from cases raising race or gender issues,
the Equal Protection Clause may again become-as Justice Oliver
Wendel Holmes once quipped-"the usual last resort of constitutional
arguments. 60
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. E.g., Johnson v. DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994)
(Voting Rights Act litigation); Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (Voting Rights Act
litigation); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994) (construing 1991 Civil
Rights Act); Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994) (construing Civil Rights
Act of 1991).
59. GERALD GuNTnER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 601-08 (12th ed. 1991).
60. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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TABLE 7
STATUTORY CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS
JUSTICE 1993 TnRM VoTEs % VOTES FOR RIGHTS CLAIM
FOR AGAINST 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
CLAIM CLAIM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERm
Blackmun 7 2 77.78 63.6 88.9 80.0 88.9 80.0
Stevens 5 4 55.56 70.0 88.9 80.0 77.8 73.7
Ginsburg 4 5 44.44 - - - - -
Souter 4 5 44.44 45.5 44.4 57.1 -
Kennedy 3 6 33.33 36.4 55.6 33.3 62.5 45.0
O'Connor 3 6 33.33 54.6 55.6 53.3 55.6 52.6
Rehnquist 3 6 33.33 36.4 44.4 33.3 44.4 35.0
Scalia 3 6 33.33 45.5 44.4 46.7 55.6 40.0
Thomas 3 6 33.33 45.5 28.6 - - -
Majority
All Cases 3 6 33.33 50.0 55.6 53.3 88.9 50.0
split
Decisions 0 4 0.00 50.0 40.0 33.3 83.3 25.0
Unanimous 3 2 60.00 50.0 75.0 83.3 100.0 87.5
Table 761 evidences a significant decrease in the percentage of
votes favoring statutory civil rights claims. This Table provides fairly
61. Cases decided in favor of claim: Lividas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2068 (1994) (hold-
ing that the National Labor Relations Act preempted the State Labor Commissioner's
policy of not enforcing immediate payment on behalf of employees covered by a collective
bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause); Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 114 S.
Ct. 367 (1993) (establishing that an employee need not suffer injury or serious psychologi-
cal harm in order to file an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for an
"abusive work environment"); Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361
(1993) (allowing reimbursement to parents who remove their child from a public school
that fails to provide an adequate education under the Individual with Disabilities Educa-
tion Act).
Cases decided against claim: Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994) (finding
that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not provide a cause of action for minority voters
who formed voting majorities in a percentage of house districts proportional to the minor-
ity's percentage of the population as a whole); Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (refus-
ing to extend § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to challenges to the size of a governing
authority); Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994) (holding that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
plaintiff who alleges unconstitutional imprisonment must establish that the underlying con-
viction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid,
or rendered suspect by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus); Rivers v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994) (refusing to apply § 101 of the Civil Rights
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clear evidence that, despite apparent liberal movement in civil actions
involving state and federal governments (This. 1 & 2) and First
Amendment claims (Tbl. 5), the Rehnquist Court remains rather con-
servative in its construction of civil rights statutes. Table 7 suggests
that the current Court is reluctant to extend congressional civil rights
enactments to their broadest possible reach.
As Figure 7 demonstrates, the voting percentages in favor of stat-
utory civil rights claims peaked in 1989 in both the "all cases" and
"split decision" categories. In that year, both percentages surpassed
80%. In contrast, the Court dropped to 33.3% in 1993 in the "all
cases" category.
Even greater is the drop in the success rate of split decisions. As
seen in Figure 7, the high point for statutory civil rights claims ac-
cepted by a divided Court was reached in 1989, when a majority voted
for over 80% of such claims. In 1993, by contrast, a divided Court did
not rule in favor of a single statutory claim; statutory civil rights claim-
ants either carried the entire Court or lost. In fact, at no previous
time in this study has the Court ever dropped below a 20% rate in
split decisions.6" Thus, it appears that the Court has become relatively
conservative in this area.
For the most part, regression analysis confirms the above obser-
vations. In the "split decisions" category, the Court majority dropped
from a 1992 score of 50% to 0% in 1993. This dramatic decrease from
the predicted score (43.1) is significant at the 0.05 level63 (App. B, Thl.
7a).
On an individual basis, Justice O'Connor experienced the great-
est shift in 1993. She decreased her voting percentage in favor of stat-
utory civil rights from 54.6% in 1992 to 33.3% in 1993. This
represents a 25.6 percentage point decrease from her predicted per-
centage of 59, a conservative movement that is significant to the 0.01
Act of 1991 retroactively); Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994) (holding that
§ 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply to lawsuits that were on appeal at the
time the Act was adopted); Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994) (holding that criminal
prosecution without probable cause is a constitutional tort, actionable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 only if accompanied by "palpable consequences").
62. See Riggs & Black, supra note 4, at 7.
63. It may surprise some that the drastic movement in 1993 split decisions is not statis-
tically significant at the 0.01 level of confidence. This fact, however, is due to the signifi-
cant divergence of past scores. The greater the difference between scores from year to
year, the greater the deviation has to be in order to be statistically significant. For exam-
ple, notice the low (Low column) and high bounds (High column) of the confidence inter-
val on Table 7a. They range from a low of 1.1% to 85.1%. Thus, to be statistically
significant, the actual score has to fall outside this range.
level of confidence. Justice Stevens also dramatically shifted his vot-
ing behavior. Table 7a shows a decrease of 20.1 percentage points
from his 1993 predicted value (75.7%) to his actual value (55.6%).
This difference is significant at the 0.05 level. The remaining Justices,
with the exception of Justice Blackmun,' show slight decreases in
their voting percentages.
TABLE 8
CASES RAISING A CHALLENGE TO
THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
JuSIcE 1993 TERM VOTES % VOTES FOR JURISDICTION
FOR AGAINST 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
JJRIS. JRuIS. TERM TBRM TRM TERM TERM TERM
Blackmun 4 4 50.00 66.7 71.4 80.0 79.2 64.9
Stevens 4 5 44.44 69.7 75.0 91.4 68.0 73.0
Ginsburg 3 6 33.33 - - - -
Kennedy 3 6 33.33 51.5 73.3 58.3 64.0 51.4
Souter 3 6 33.33 56.3 75.0 57.6 -
Thomas 3 6 33.33 54.6 66.7 - -
O'Connor 2 7 22.22 53.1 63.3 54.3 68.0 51.4
Rehnquist 2 7 22.22 54.6 62.1 54.3 60.0 51.4
Scalia 2 7 22.22 51.5 55.2 48.5 60.0 50.0
Majority
AU Cases 3 6 33.33 52.9 73.3 63.9 64.0 62.2
Split
Decisions 1 2 33.33 37.5 69.2 38.9 33.0 62.5
Unanimous 2 3 40.00 66.7 76.5 88.9 81.3 61.9
Table 865 indicates significant conservative movement on jurisdic-
tional issues. As Figure 8 illustrates, in 1991 the Court majority ac-
cepted nearly 75% of all jurisdictional claims. In 1993, however, the
64. Justice Blacknun tops Table 7 by voting in favor of statutory civil rights claims
77.8% of the time; this represents an increase of 14.2 percentage points over his 1992 Term
percentage of 63.6. Justice Blackmun voted against a statutory civil rights claim only when
the entire Court acted unanimously.
65. Cases where the Court exercised jurisdiction: McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568
(1994) (holding that a federal court has jurisdiction to enter a stay of execution once capi-
tal defendant invokes right to appointment of habeas counsel under federal statute); FDIC
v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996 (1994) (holding that federal, not state, law provides source of
liability for constitutional tort claim against federal agency); National Org. for Women v.
Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994) (establishing that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
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acceptance rate for all jurisdictional claims dropped to 33.3%. The
Court issued unanimous opinions on jurisdictional issues in favor of
jurisdictional claims only 40% of the time, down 26.7 percentage
points from 1992.66
Regression analysis confirms that the above trend is significant.
The Court majority's actual voting percentage in the "all" category
cases (33.3%) was 30.6 percentage points below its 1993 predicted
value (63.9%), a difference significant at the 0.01 level67 (App. B, Thl.
8a). In addition, the 1993 rate for unanimous decisions in Table 8 is
44.9 percentage points below the 1993 predicted value (84.9%) and
the actual value (40%). This difference is also statistically significant
at the 0.01 level68 (App. B, Thl. 8a).
On an individual basis, every single Justice for whom a regression
analysis can be performed showed a statistically significant decrease
(at the 0.01 level) in his or her 1993 jurisdictional voting pattern.69
Justice Blackmun decreased from a 1992 rate of 66.7% and a 1993
predicted rate of 76.4% to an actual rate of 50%. Justice Stevens de-
creased from 69.7% in 1992 to a 1993 actual rate of 44.4%, 37.2 per-
Organizations Act does not require that racketeering or its predicate acts be motivated by
an economic purpose).
Cases where the Court did not exercise jurisdiction: Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop
Direct, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1992 (1994) (holding that a court's refusal to enforce a settlement
agreement allegedly immunizing a party from suit is not immediately appealable as a col-
lateral order); Dalton v. Specter, 114 S. Ct. 1719 (1994) (refusing to review Senator's re-
quest for an injunction to prevent the closure of a Naval shipyard); Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994) (ruling that a federal district court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim merely because the contract in ques-
tion was part of the settlement of an earlier federal lawsuit); Northwest Airlines v. County
of Kent, 114 S. Ct. 855, 862 (1994) (declining to assert jurisdiction over the issue whether
Anti-Head Tax Act creates a private cause of action); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich,
114 S. Ct. 771 (1994) (holding that federal Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977
precludes district court jurisdiction over pre-enforcement challenges to the Act); Izumi
Seimitsu Kogyo v. U. S. Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993) (dismissing writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted because the question that needed to be addressed was not presented
in the original petition for certiorari).
66. Split decisions, in which jurisdictional claims were accepted only 33.3% of the
time, fall in the same range as the acceptance rates for all and unanimous cases. This
33.3% split decision percentage, however, is not unusual when compared with the 1989 and
1990 split decision percentages of 33% and 38.9%.
67. The Durbin-Watson value (DW) of 0.97 for this movement, however, suggests pos-
sible auto-correlation.
68. As with the movement in the "all" category cases, the Durbin-Watson value (DW)
of 0.84 suggests auto-correlation. While the difference between the predicted and actual
values in the unanimous category is fairly large (44.9), the small Durbin-Watson value
nonetheless places the statistical significance finding in question.
69. The Durbin-Watson value for Justice Blackmun's score, 0.94, suggests auto-corre-
lation. This score is 0.06 below the acceptable Durbin-Watson range of one through three.
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centage points below his predicted rate of 81.6%. Justice Kennedy
dropped from 51.5% in 1992 to 33.3% in 1993, 29.4 percentage points
lower than his predicted rate. Justice O'Connor dropped 30.9 per-
centage points from her 1992 voting percentage (53.1) and 40.6 per-
centage points from her predicted rate to score only 22.2% in 1993.
Chief Justice Rehnquist went from 54.6% in 1992 to 22.2% in 1993,
38.8 percentage points below his predicted value of 61%. Finally, Jus-
tice Scalia dropped from 51,5% in 1992 to 22.2% in 1993, 35.9 per-
centage points below his 1993 predicted value,
Such dramatic statistics clearly suggest that the Court was more
conservative on jurisdictional issues in 1993 than in earlier years.
Commentators noted that the Supreme Court heard less than the
usual number of cases during the 1993 Term and the Court decided
only eight-four cases with full opinions.70 Furthermore, on the open-
ing day of the 1994 Term-for the first time in memory71-the Court
did not accept review of any new cases. Table 8, of course, does not
explain why the Court has become markedly more conservative in the
exercise of its constitutional and statutory authority. It does, however,
suggest that the Court's shrinking docket may be linked to a growing
reticence to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Although Table 97 shows that states were less successful during
the 1993 Term than during the 1992 Term in cases where their inter-
ests collided with federal authority, the overall data do not reveal any
70. Glen Elsasser, High Court Chooses Not to Decide: Justices Examine Lowest
Number of Cases Since 1960's, Cm. Teir., July 3, 1994, at 7; Linda Greenhouse, A Split
Court, ST. PETERSBURG Tnins, July 10, 1994, at D1; Supreme Court Without Lions, BALm.
MORE SUN, July 11, 1994, at 6A.
71. Aaron Epstein, High Court Supremely Picky in '94: Record Few Cases Reaching the
Top, Pm. INoUIRER, Oct. 9, 1994, at D2 (stating that "on the opening day of the court's
204th season, the justices [sic] had 1,626 cases before them and couldn't muster the four
votes needed to accept any" cases); Supreme Court Turns Down 1,600 Appeals, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 4, 1994, at A4 (noting that the Court "granted review in none of the new
cases" and that "[n]o one around the court could recall a First Monday in October without
a grant of review").
72. Cases decided in favor of states: Hawaiian Airlines Inc. v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239
(1994) (holding that the Railway Labor Act does not preempt state law tort actions that do
not arise out of a collective-bargaining agreement); O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S.
Ct. 2048 (1994) (recognizing that California law rather than federal law governs the tort
liability of attorneys who counseled a now-failed savings and loan); American Dredging
Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994) (concluding that Louisiana forum non conveniens stat-
ute governing admiralty cases was not preempted by federal law); Northwest Airlines v.
County of Kent, 114 S. Ct. 855 (1994) (finding that county airport's user fees did not violate
Anti-Head Tax Act or the Commerce Clause); Department of Revenue v. ACF Indus., 114
S. Ct. 843 (1994) (approving Oregon ad valorem tax imposed upon railroad property de-
spite the fact that the taxing scheme exempted many other classes of commercial and in-
dustrial property).
TABLE 9
FEDERALISM CASES
JusnCE 1993 TERM VOTES % VOTES FOR STATE CLAIM
FOR FOR 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 /1988
STATE U.S. TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Ba1ckmun 5 2 71.43 53.3 43.5 14.3 43.8 40.9
Rehnquist 5 2 71.43 73.3 43.5 71.4 56.3 81.0
Ginsburg 4 3 57.14 - - - -
O'Connor 4 3 57.14 73.3 39.1 71.4 56.3 73.7
Scalia 4 3 57.14 60.0 26.1 71.4 56.3 76.2
Souter 4 3 57.14 60.0 36.4 83.3 - -
Stevens 4 3 57.14 60.0 31.8 28.6 43.8 57.1
Kennedy 3 4 42.86 60.0 26.1 71.4 56.3 72.7
Thomas 3 4 42.86 66.7 35.0 - - -
Majority
All Cases 4 3 57.14 66.7 26.1 71.4 43.8 59.1
Split
Decisions 1 1 50.00 57.1 28.6 80.0 25.0 50.0
Unanimous 3 2 60.00 75.0 22.2 50.0 50.0 70.0
significant conservative or liberal shift. Figure 9 demonstrates that the
Court's voting pattern in the federalism area has been volatile, rang-
ing from the low mid-twenties (1989) to 80.0% (1990). The outcome
for the Court as a whole in all, split, and unanimous decisions for 1993
is at about the midpoint of these previous gyrations.
The voting rates for the individual Justices confirm the above
analysis. Only Justice Blackmun evidences significant movement, in-
creasing his voting percentage in favor of state claims by 18.1 percent-
age points over his 1992 score, a difference significant at the 0.05 level
(App. B, Thl. 9a). This movement, however, merely restores Black-
mun to the top of Table 9, a position he occupied in 1991.71 The re-
maining Justices made slight shifts in both directions, but none that
Cases decided in favor of the federal government: West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,
114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994) (invalidating, under the Commerce Clause, a Massachusetts assess-
ment on all fluid milk sold to retailers within the state); Lividas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct.
2068 (1994) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act preempted state labor commis-
sioner's policy of not enforcing immediate payment statute on behalf of employees covered
by a collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause).
73. Wilkins et al., supra note 40, at 23.
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are statistically significant. Thus, it appears that the Court did not
significantly modify its position with respect to federalism issues dur-
ing the 1993 Term.
In 1993, 14 cases were decided by a margin of one vote. In these
"swing-vote" cases,74 the shift of a single Justice from the majority to
the minority position would result in a different outcome. As in 1992,
in 1993 a conservative coalition most often collected the crucial fifth
vote.75 A conservative coalition was victorious in 64.3% of the cases
decided by a single vote, an outcome within a single percentage point
of the 1992 figure (63.6%).
Although their order is somewhat different, the Justices who hold
the top three positions on Table 10 in 1993 are the same as last Term.
Justice Kennedy claimed the top spot as the Court's most "swinging"
74. We call this "swing-vote" analysis because it identifies members of the Court who
most frequently shift, or "swing," from one voting coalition to another in order to form a
majority. Because each vote is crucial to the outcome of a case decided by a single vote,
swing voting is an important index of ideological influence on Court decisionmaking.
75. The definitions of conservative and liberal used elsewhere in this study are also
used when classifying a coalition as conservative or liberal.
TABLE 10
SWING-VOTE ANALYSIS: WHO VOTES MOST OFrEN
WIrH THE MAjORITY IN CLOSE CASES
JuSTICE 1993 TEM VOTES % VOTES wITH MAjO~rY
FOR AOAINST 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
MAJ. MAY. TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Kennedy 13 1 92.86 72.7 64.7 52.2 71.4 82.4
Rehnquist 10 4 71.43 72.7 41.2 69.6 66.7 76.5
Scalia 10 4 71.43 81.8 35.3 52.2 66.7 73.5
O'Connor 8 6 57.14 40.9 58.8 69.6 69.0 76.5
Thomas 8 6 57.14 72.7 23.5 - - -
Souter 6 8 42.86 31.8 82.4 59.1 - -
Blackmun 5 9 35.71 31.8 70.6 47.8 33.3 38.2
Ginsburg 5 9 35.71 - - - - -
Stevens 5 9 35.71 40.9 58.8 47.8 42.9 26.5
Conservative
Coalition 9 5 64.29 63.6 41.2 54.5 64.3 76.5
Liberal
Coalition 5 9 35.71 36.4 58.8 45.5 35.7 23.5
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member, voting with the majority coalition 92.9% of the time. In fact,
other members of the Court were able to forge a five-member coali-
tion only once this Term without garnering the vote of Justice Ken-
nedy.76 Justice Scalia, who last Term topped the chart, fell to second
place (where he tied with the Chief Justice at 71.4%). Next came an-
other pair, Justices O'Connor and Thomas, who joined the majority
57.1% of the time.
The gap between Justice Thomas and Justice Souter divides the
Justices who formed the usual conservative coalition from those who
composed the usual liberal group. Justice Souter voted with the ma-
jority only 42.9% of the time-a fairly dramatic 40 percentage point
decrease from 1991, when he was the most influential swing voter on
the Court. This swing-vote statistic suggests that Justice Souter may
have abandoned his early role as a "moderate" centrist in favor of a
more peripheral liberal role on the Court.7 7 At the bottom of the
chart are Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg, who all tied for
last place, voting with the majority 35.7% of the time.
While the results of this Table are not dispositive proof of any
Justice's ideological position, they nevertheless suggest two rather no-
table alignments. First, as noted above, Justice Souter's solid position
within the Court's liberal coalition suggests that any conservative
promise held by this Bush-appointee may have vanished. Second, Jus-
tice Ginsburg's placement with the two most politically liberal Jus-
tices, Blackmun and Stevens, suggests that she may well turn out to be
more liberal than she was portrayed in the popular press at the time of
her appointment.78 Despite this possibility, her appointment has not
76. Reed v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 2291 (1994).
77. It is also possible that the Court has moved to the right and acquired a new ideo-
logical center. Such a proposition is dubious, however, when one considers that the only
change in the makeup of the Court since the 1991 Term has been the retirement of Justice
White and his replacement with the seemingly more liberal Justice Ginsburg.
78. Joan Biskupic, Justice Ginsburg Goes 25 for 25 on Voting with Court Majority,
WASH. Posr, Apr. 1,1994, at A3 (relating that "[a]s an appeals judge, Ginsburg was known
for a moderate judicial approach"); Timothy M. Phelps, Independent Streak Leads Dead
Center: Justice Ginsburg's Rulings are Neither as Liberal as the White House Expected Nor
as Conservative as Many Liberals had Feared, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 10, 1994, at G1
(asserting that "Ginsburg's place in the dead center on a generally conservative court may
have surprised some in the White House"). But cf Harold W. Anderson, Call Judge Gins-
burg "Liberal" Like Clinton, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Aug. 14,1994, at 25A (arguing that
Justice Ginsburg may be more liberal than many journalists, who frequently refer to her as
a "centrist," are willing to admit).
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(at least yet) placed a liberal coalition at the helm of the Court's five-
to-four composition.7
9
IV. Conclusion
Generally, the 1993 Term showed a decrease in the Court's sup-
port of state and local governments in both civil and criminal cases,
and a resurgence in the Court's sensitivity to First Amendment con-
cerns. This liberal ideological movement, however, is remarkable be-
cause it appears to come not from Justices Blackmun and Stevens, but
rather from Justices Scalia and Thomas. Whether this unusual devel-
opment will continue, or whether it is only a ephemeral reaction to
transitory politics, remains to be seen.
The Rehnquist Court, in any event, remains quite conservative in
its approach to statutory civil rights and jurisdictional issues. Despite
the appointment of Justice Ginsburg, conservative coalitions continue
to control the outcome of closely divided cases. They have done so,
however, only because Justice Kennedy holds a virtual stranglehold
on the crucial fifth vote. Justice Kennedy, who voted with the Court
majority in almost 93% of all five-to-four decisions, is arguably the
single most influential Justice of the 1993 Term.
79. Cf Wilkins et al., supra note 40, at 261 (raising the question whether Justice Gins-
burg's appointment to the Court would shift the locus of control in swing-vote decisions).
V. Appendix A
A. The Universe of Cases
Only cases decided during the 1993 Term by a full opinion setting
forth reasons for the decision are included in the data. Decisions on
motions are excluded even if accompanied by an opinion. Cases han-
dled by summary disposition are included if accompanied by a full
opinion of the Court, but not if the only opinion is a dissent. Cases
decided by a four-to-four vote, hence resulting in affirmance without
written opinion, are excluded. Both signed and per curiam opinions
are considered full opinions if they set forth reasons in a more than
perfunctory manner. Cases not fitting within any of the categories of
the different tables are, of course, not included in the database for any
of the tables.
B. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly
understood definitions. Generally, the nature of the case is clearly
identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a prob-
lem of classification. No cases in 1993 raised such a question.
C. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties-Tables 1 through 4
Cases are included in Tables I through 4 only if governmental and
private entities appear as opposing parties. This is necessarily true of
criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these tables if they do
not satisfy this criterion. The governmental entity might be the gov-
ernment itself, one of its agencies or officials, or, with respect to state
government, one of its political subdivisions. A suit against an official
in her personal capacity is included if she is represented by govern-
ment attorneys or if the interests of the government are otherwise
clearly implicated. In instances of multiple parties, a civil case is ex-
cluded if governmental entities appear on both sides of the contro-
versy. If both a state and a federal entity are parties to the same suit
on the same side with only private parties on the other, the case is
included in Tables 1 and 2. A case is included more than once in the
same table if it raises two or more distinct issues affecting the outcome
of the case and the issues are resolved by different voting alignments.
D. Classification by Nature of the Issue-Tables 5 through 9
A case is included in each category of Tables 5 through 9 for
which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed in the written opin-
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ion(s). One case may thus be included in two or more tables. A case is
also included more than once in the same table if it raises two or more
distinct issues in that category affecting the disposition of the case and
if the issues are resolved by different voting alignments. A case is not
included for any issue which, though raised by one of the litigants, is
not addressed in any opinion.
Identification of First Amendment and equal protection issues
poses no special problem. In each instance, the nature of the claim is
expressly identified in the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press,
association, and free exercise of religion are included. Establishment
Clause cases are excluded, however, because one party's claim of reli-
gious establishment is often arrayed against another party's claim of
free exercise or some other individual right, thus blurring the issue of
individual rights.
Cases included in Table 7, statutory civil rights claims, are limited
to those invoking relevant sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,80 as
amended; the Voting Rights Act of 1965;81 and the civil fights statutes
expressly barring discrimination on the basis of race, color, national
origin, sex, religion, age, or physical handicap. Actions brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 are included if the substantive right asserted is based
on a federal statute or if the issue is the application of § 1983; that is,
whether or how that section's protections apply in the case at hand.
However, § 1983 actions are excluded if the substantive right asserted
is based on the United States Constitution and the issue relates to the
constitutional right. The purpose of the distinction in § 1983 cases is
to preserve a demarcation between constitutional and non-constitu-
tional claims.
For Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include not
only jurisdiction per se but also standing, mootness, ripeness, absten-
tion, equitable discretion, and justiciability. Jurisdictional questions
are excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no member of
the Court dissents on the question, even though the Court may com-
ment on its jurisdiction.
Table 9, federalism cases, is limited to issues raised by conflicting
actions of federal and state or local governments. Common examples
are preemption, intergovernmental immunities, application of the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments as a limit on action by the federal
government, and federal court interference with state court activities
(other than review of state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal"
80. PUB. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified as amended in scattered statutes).
81. PUB. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 435 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)).
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federalism or interstate relationships, such as those raised by the dor-
mant Commerce Clause 2 or the Privileges and Immunities Clause,83
are excluded from the Table.
E. The "Swing-vote" Cases-Table 10
Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a single
vote. This category also is intended to include four-to-three decisions,
if any, as well as five-to-three and four-to-two decisions resulting in
reversal of a lower court decision. Affirmances by a vote of five-to-
three or four-to-two are not included because a shift of one vote from
the majority to the minority position would still result in affirmance,
by a tie vote. A case is included more than once in the Table if it
raises two or more distinct issues affecting .the disposition of the case
and the issues are resolved by different voting alignments.
F. Cases Included in Statistical Tables
Table t: Civil Cases: State/Local
Government versus Private Party
Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994)
Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman, 114 S. Ct. 1815 (1994)
(unanimous)
Barclay Bank v. Franchise Tax Board, 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994)
Board of Education v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994)
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994)
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994) (unanimous)
Department of Revenue v. ACF Industries, 114 S. Ct. 843 (1994)
Department of Taxation & Finance v. Milhelm Attea, 114 S. Ct. 2028
(1994) (unanimous)
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (swing vote)
Elder v. Holloway, 114 S. Ct. 1019 (1994) (unanimous)
Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993)
(unanimous)
Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994) (unanimous)
Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (swing vote)
Ibafiez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regula-
tion, 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994) (two issues, one unanimous)
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994)
Lividas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2068 (1994) (unanimous)
82. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Northwest Airlines v. County of Kent, 114 S. Ct. 855 (1994) (Black-
mun, J., did not participate in the decision)
Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of Environmental Quality, 114
S. Ct. 1345 (1994)
Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994)
West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994)
Table 2: Civil Cases: Federal Government
versus Private Party
ABF Freight System v. NLRB, 114 S. Ct. 835 (1994) (unanimous)
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994) (swing
vote)
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich
Collieries, 114 S. Ct. 2251 (1994)
FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996 (1994) (two issues; two unanimous-
one for, one against)
Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) (unanimous)
Key Tronic Corporation v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994)
MCI Telecommunications Corporation v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. 2223
(1994) (O'Connor, J., did not participate in the decision)
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation of America, 114 S.
Ct. 1778 (1994) (swing vote)
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994) (unanimous)
Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994) (swing
vote)
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S. Ct. 771 (1994) (unanimous)
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994)
(unanimous)
United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994) (unanimous)
United States v. Irvine, 114 S. Ct. 1473 (unanimous) (Blackmun, J.,
did not participate in the decision)
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492
(1993) (two issues, one unanimous, one swing vote)
Table 3: State Criminal Cases
Burden v. Zant, 114 S. Ct. 654 (1994) (unanimous)
Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 S. Ct. 948 (1994)
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) (swing
vote)
Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994)
McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994) (two issues, one swing vote)
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Powell v. Nevada, 114 S. Ct. 1280 (1994)
Reed v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 2291 (1994) (swing vote)
Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004 (1994) (swing vote)
Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994)
Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994) (two issues, one
swing vote)
Stansbury v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1526 (1994) (unanimous)
Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630 (1994)
Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) (two issues, one
unanimous)
Table 4: Federal Criminal Cases
Beecham v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1669 (1994) (unanimous)
Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994)
Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (unanimous)
Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994) (unanimous)
Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994)
Posters 'n' Things Ltd. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1747 (1994)
(unanimous)
Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994) (swing vote)
Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419 (1994)
Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994)
United States v. Granderson, 114 S. Ct. 1259 (1994)
Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752 (1994) (unanimous)
Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994) (unanimous)
Table 5: Cases Raising a Challenge to First Amendment
Rights of Expression, Association, and
Free Exercise of Religion
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994) (unanimous)
Ibafiez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regula-
tion, 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994) (two issues, one unanimous)
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (two
issues)
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994)
(swing vote)
Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994)
Table 6: Cases Involving Equal Protection Claims
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994)
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Table 7: Cases Involving Statutory Civil Rights Claims
Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994)
Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993)
(unanimous)
Harris v. Forklift Systems, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (unanimous)
Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994) (unanimous)
Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (swing vote)
Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994) (unanimous)
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994)
Lividas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2068 (1994) (unanimous)
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994)
Table 8: Cases Involving Jurisdictional Issues
Dalton v. Specter, 114 S. Ct. 1719 (1994) (unanimous)
Digital Equipment Corporation v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 114 S. Ct.
1992 (1994) (unanimous)
FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996 (1994) (unanimous)
Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo v. U. S. Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993)
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, 114 S.
Ct.
1673 (1994) (unanimous)
McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994) (swing vote)
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994)
(unanimous)
Northwest Airlines v. County of Kent, 114 S. Ct. 855 (1994) (Black-
mun, J., did not participate in the decision)
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S. Ct. 771 (1994) (unanimous)
Table 9: Cases Raising a Federalism Issue
American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994)
Department of Revenue v. ACF Industries, 114 S. Ct. 843 (1994)
Hawaiian Airlines Inc. v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239 (1994) (unanimous)
Lividas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2068 (1994) (unanimous)
Northwest Airlines v. County of Kent, 114 S. Ct. 855 (1994) (Black-
mun, J., did not participate in the decision)
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994) (unanimous)
West Lynn Creamery, Inc., v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994)
Table 10: Swing-Vote Cases
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994) (con-
servative outcome)
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (con-
servative outcome)
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) (lib-
eral outcome)
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (conservative outcome)
Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (conservative outcome)
McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994) (liberal outcome)
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation of America, 114 S.
Ct. 1778 (1994) (conservative outcome)
Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994) (liberal outcome)
Reed v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 2291 (1994) (conservative outcome)
Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004 (1994) (conservative outcome)
Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994) (conservative
outcome)
Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994) (con-
servative outcome)
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (lib-
eral outcome)
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492
(1993) (liberal outcome)
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TABLE Is
CIVIL CASES: STATE GOVERNMRT
VERSUS APRIVATEhPARTY
% VOTES FOR GOVERMI'34T
JUSTICE 1987 1M3 199 1990 1991 1992 a b SE 10) Low Mh m(y) Dif. Sxnf. DW AC
Scalia 51.7 59.2 64.9 64.0 64.3 41.7 2081 -1.017 9.3 54.1 35.5 72.6 50.0 -4.1 1.39
O'Connor 50.0 57.4 67.6 68.0 50.0 50.0 1296 .0.623 8.7 55.0 37.5 72.4 40.9 -14.1 0.93 ,
Blankmun 44.8 30.6 43.2 24.0 35.7 30.3 4378 -2.183 8.1 27.1 11.0 43.3 42.9 15.7 2.75
Kennedy 50.0 57.1 61.1 76.0 42.9 41.7 3098 -1.977 12.9 47.9 22.1 73.7 40.9 -7.0 1.39
Stevens 37.9 35.4 40.5 36.0 29.3 31.3 3207 -1.594 4.1 29.5 21.2 37.8 273 -2.2 0.34 0
Mito AnCames 51.7 51.0 51.4 64.0 52.4 41.7 1939 -0.949 7.1 48.7 34.5 62.9 40.9 -7.8 1.14
S!ltDeasons 53.8 64.0 52.4 63.8 51.6 44.4 5332 -2.651 8.9 47.4 29.5 65.3 46.2 -1.2 .57
Unanimous 37.5 50.0 50.0 55.6 54.6 38.9 -1453 0.754 7.8 50.4 34.9 66.0 33.3 .17.1 0 8.97 0
TABLE 2a
CIVIL CASES: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
VERSUS APRIVATE PARTY
% VOTES FOR GOVERNMENT
JUSTICE 1987 1983 1989 1990 1991 1992 a b SE p(v) Low High (v) Dif. S f. DW AC
Stevens 55.9 42.9 57.1 40.0 57.1 34.4 4709 -2343 10.0 39.7 19.6 59.8 70.6 30.9 2.95
Blackmun 50.0 60.7 643 60.0 57.1 48.5 1341 -0.646 63 54.5 42.0 67.1 68.8 14.2 * 2.00
Relnquist 61.8 71.4 78.6 70.0 71.4 74.2 -2964 1.526 5.5 76.6 65.5 87.7 58.8 -17.8 1.62
Kennedy 58.3 66.7 60.7 55.6 76.2 70.0 -4591 2.340 7.3 72.8 57.2 83.4 52.9 .19.8 * 2.11
Scalia 62.5 593 60.7 57.9 71.4 67.7 -3319 1.700 5.2 69.2 58.7 79.7 52.9 -163 - 1.90
O'Connor 76.5 60.7 60.7 60.0 52.4 62.5 5496 -2.731 7.9 52.6 36.8 683 563 3.7 1.31
M ~oAlCam 61.8 643 71A 60.0 81.0 66.7 -3525 186 7.7 73.9 58.4 89.3 52.9 -20.9 * 2.13
SplitDeconons 55.6 66.7 66.7 60.0 833 76.5 .8322 4.217 10.3 82.9 62.4 103.4 42.9 -40.0 1.76
jnanimous 68.8 61.5 76.9 60.0 77.8 563 1801 -0.871 9.1 63.3 45.7 82.0 60.0 -3.3 3.01 9
TABLE3s,
STATE CRINAL CASES
%VOTES FOR GOVERNMW3T
JUSTICE 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 a b SE p(y) Low Il a(v) Dif. S . DW AC
Rehinust 73.7 35.2 853 81.5 66.7 90.0 -1182 0.634 8.6 82.6 65.3 99.9 81.3 .1.4 2.64
Scalia 47.4 77.8 73.5 74.1 77.8 86.4 -11046 5-589 133 92.4 65.8 119.0 81.3 -11.1 1.13
O'Comor 61.1 77.8 76.5 66.7 333 66.7 6618 -3.294 16.2 52.2 19.8 84.5 63.3 16.6 1.95
Kennedy 70.0 31.5 73.5 57.7 50.0 773 4263 -2.109 12.1 61.0 36.7 85.2 50.0 .11.0 1.95
Stevens 21.1 37.0 20.6 0.0 27.8 31.8 -273 0.151 12.9 23.6 .2.3 49.4 25.0 1.4 2.13
Blancimun 263 37.0 353 14.8 33.3 25.0 2194 -1.089 8.3 24.8 8.2 41.4 12.5 -12.3 1.94
MoiltyAM.Cases 47.4 70.4 64.7 55.6 44.4 773 -3487 1.783 13.0 66.2 40.1 92.3 56.3 .10.0 2.66
SaiLDecisions 53.8 72.7 70.0 68.2 333 84.6 -1869 0.971 17.9 67.2 31.4 102.9 61.5 -5.6 2.96
Unanimous 16.7 60.0 25.0 0.0 66.7 66.7 -13393 7.003 28.9 63.7 5.8 121.6 333 .30.4 1 2.20 _
Webn .-: y iAonpt b-loe of 6.e liae SE -StodudEro
p(v) - 193 ptonlcted votie~ . LOW- d. lowbo-dof- oidd t &e.05 lev
MI(GI-dee hio*b dofomodeao e o d est..05 leval e(v).- 1993 edolvo6mfpeeved.p
fl" -dffeao bmm ~ & eos.Od vels .d& lei us a (, if-pKv) - v))
SgL£ (ifadeei w. a e') -di0~a~e bda6. e ee~o dd vae amd6 e a~evea] odalve y p i i .ev.8 () e.l) lel ofoo6e.
DW-D., -Webos86laiic
AC C..mdwih a) - Durb.-Wmt- d66 i.id..b.1- I 1..eb-v 3. a "gd-M.oe.o
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TABML4a
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
% VOTES FOR GOVENMENT
JUSTICE 1987 1938 199 1990 1991 1992 a bSE v Low I -. aJ) Dif. Sf. DW AC
Re9mqut 85.7 8.9 77.8 70.0 76.9 81.3 3820 -1.980 6.7 73.5 60.0 7.0 833 9.8 1.11
O'Conor 71.4 77.3 77.3 70.0 76.9 75.0 -352 0.214 3.4 75.6 63.3 823 75.0 -0.6 2.96
Kladv 71.4 23.9 6.7 50.0 4.6 60,0 4993 -2-474 14.7 61.6 32.2 91.0 66.7 5.1 2.67
Scalia 64.3 66.7 66.7 40.0 76.9 62.5 353 -0.146 12.3 62.3 37.8 86.9 66.7 4.3 3.02 #
laclkmu 78.6 55.6 44.4 70.0 61.5 46.7 6665 -3.320 13.3 47.8 21.2 74.5 58.3 10.5 1.95
Ntevam 64.3 66.7 33.3 60.0 38.5 26.7 14026 -7.026 17.4 23.7 -11.2 58.5 50.0 263 1.95
M~OiYA C. 78.6 8.9 66.7 60.0 69.2 68.8 6593 -3.280 10.2 60.6 40.2 80.9 66.7 6.1 1.34
8plkiDedions 75.0 100.0 83.3 50.0 55.6 77.8 8742 1 -4.357 18.4 53.4 21.6 95.2 50.0 -8.4 1.52
Unliou 100.0 66.7 33.3 75.0 100.0 57.1 4216 .2-083 25.8 64.7 13.2 1163 833 18.6 2.07
TABLE Sa
FIRST AMENDMNr RIGHTS OF EXPRRSSION,
ASSOCIATIOX AND FRE EERCISE OF RELIGION
%VOTES FORRIG1IM CLAIM
JUSTICE 1907 19M 1909 1990 1991 1992 b  SE .. Lw .60 Dif. S f. DW AC
Scaia 38.5 353 26.7 25.0 37.5 45.5 -2233 1.140 7.7 38.7 23.3 54.2 85.7 47.0 -- 0.76 #
Blscabnmt 69.2 41.2 60.0 69.2 8.9 90.0 -14499 7323 18.4 95.4 53.6 132.1 71.4 -24.0 1.16
Kwm~dV 66.7 37.5 40.0 41.7 77.8 77.8 -10067 5.089 19.3 74.7 36.1 113.3 71.4 -33 1.08
O'Como 23.1 25.0 26.7 54.5 77.8 36.4 14324 7.220 21.6 65.9 2.6 109.1 57.1 -8.8 135
Rahnqui t 16.7 12.8 133 16.7 50.0 36.4 -11037 5.586 14.6 44.9 15.6 74.1 42.9 -2-0 1.04
Stavema 50.0 64.7 46.7 50.0 100.0 90.0 -17509 8.834 2.9 97.8 52.1 143.5 S7.1 -40.7 1.58
Majoy All Cume 50.0 353 40.0 25.0 66.7 45.5 -3179 1.620 14.2 49.4 21.1 77.8 57.1 7.7 241
Sp16Dectmonz 50.0 23.2 40.0 30.0 57.1 333 -598 0.320 13.0 39.9 13.9 65.9 40.0 0.1 13.00
21m"imouz 5.0 50.0 40.0 0.0 100. 60.0 -9045 4.571 32.2 66.0 1.5 130.5 100.0 34.0 1 2.03
TABLE6a
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS
% VOTES FO RIGHTS CLAIM
USTICE 197 199 1939 1990 1991 1992 a b SE v) Low Ilia a(y) Dif. S3f.I DW AC
Blackmmw 50.0 60.0 0.0 833 50.0 40.0 -140 0.094 27.4 47.5 -73 102.4 100.0 52.5 2.51
Kenedy 333 57.1 25.0 42.9 50.0 20.0 4011 -1.997 14.5 31.1 2.1 60.0 100.0 68.9 2.14
O'Conmor 12.5 66.7 25.0 28.6 33.3 40.0 -2291 1.169 18.3 38.4 1.8 75.1 100.0 61.6 - 1.57
Stevenm 2.6 66.7 0.0 833 66.7 40.0 -7928 4.009 30.6 61.6 03 122.8 100.0 38.4 2.48
Ronuiot 12.5 57.1 20.0 143 50.0 20.0 -560 0300 19A 30.0 -8.8 68.8 0.0 -30.0 2.29
sealk 12.5 S7.1 25.0 14.3 333 20.0 2562 -1.274 16.6 22.6 -10.5 55.7 0.0 -22.6 2.04
ASoCity D 12.5 57.1 0.0 42.9 50.0 20.0 -3329 1.609 228 36 3 -9.3 82.0 100.0 63.7 * 2.14
Sp Ikedlions 0.0 100.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 333 -3741 1.900 37.5 45.5 -29.5 120. 100.0 54.5 2.66
Unmimono 20.0 50.0 0.0 33 50.0 00 3317 .1.906 22.8 1.9 .26.7 64.4 0.0 -18.9 231
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TALE 7a
STATUTORY CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS
% VOTES FOR RIGHTS CLAIM
JUSTICE 1987 1983 1989 1999 1991 1992 a b SE (v) Low High ) Dil S DW IAC
Blobumw L 87.5 80.0 88.9 80.0 88.9 63.6 5862 -2.906 9.7 713 51.9 90.7 77.8 6.5 233
Stees 87.5 73.7 77.8 80.0 88.9 70.0 2336 -1.134 7.5 75.7 60.7 90.6 55.6 -20.1 * 1.10
Kennedy 66.7 45.0 62.5 33.3 55.6 36.4 8514 -4.254 13.8 35.0 7.4 62.7 33.3 -1.7 2-09
O'Connor 42.9 52.6 55.6 53.3 55.6 54.6 -3654 1.863 4.8 59.0 493 68.6 33.3 -25.6 1.32
Relmhnut 37.5 35.0 44.4 33.3 44.4 36.4 -621 0.331 4.8 39.7 30.1 49.2 33.3 -6.3 3.01 0
Scalia 57.1 40.0 55.6 46.7 44.4 45.5 3101 -1.534 6.7 42.8 29.4 563 33.3 -9.5 1.84
Maoity ADCam 75.0 50.0 88.9 53.3 55.6 50.0 8236 -4.109 16.1 47.8 15.5 80.0 33.3 -14.4 1.84
S litDedsion 60.0 25.0 83.3 33.3 40.0 50.0 3175 -1571 21.0 43.1 1.1 85.1 0.0 -43.1 * 2.31
n ous 100.0 87.5 1I00.0 83.3 75.0 50.0 17374 -8.691 18.7 52.2 14.8 89.6 60.0 7.8 0.63 #
TABLE &a
CASES RAISING A CHALLENGE TO
THE EERCISE OF JURSDICTION
%VOTES FOR JURSDICTION
JUSTICE 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 a b SE p(,) Low Ift N) Dif. Sxf. DW AC
Blackntn 58.1 64.9 79.2 80.0 71.4 66.7 -3528 1.809 8-5 76.4 59.3 93.5 50.0 -26.4 0.88 s
Stevens 57.1 73.0 68.0 91A 75.0 69.7 -5190 2.640 11.2 81.6 59.2 104.0 44.4 -37.2 135
Kennedy 56.3 51.4 64.0 58.3 73.3 51.5 -1987 1.029 8.4 62-7 46.0 79.5 33.3 -29.4 1.35
O'Connor 42.9 51.4 68.0 54.3 63.3 53.1 -4094 2.086 8.9 62.8 44.9 80.7 22.2 40.6 1.24
Relmquit 47.9 51.4 60.0 54.3 62.1 54.6 -3350 1.711 53 61.0 50.5 70.6 23.2 -38.8 1.21
Scalia 36.6 50.0 60.0 48-5 55.2 51.5 -4418 2.246 7.9 58.2 42.4 73.9 22.2 -35.9 1.34
Moity AU Cam 55.8 62.2 64.0 63.9 73.3 52.9 -1001 0.534 7.2 63.9 49.6 78.2 33.3 -30.6 0.97 #
SprtDedsions 71.4 62.5 33.0 38.9 69.2 37.5 8209 14.100 17.5 37.7 2.8 72.7 33.3 4.4 1.601
Uninimous 48.3 61.9 81.3 88.9 76-5 66.7 -8081 4.097 14.6 84.9 55.7 114.2 40.0 -44.9 10.84 N
TABLE 9a
F1DERALISM CASES
%VOTES FOR STATE CLAIM
JUSTICE 1987 1983 1989 1990 1991 1992 a b SE p(v) Low i s~v) Dif. Sm. DW AC
Blackmann 46.2 40.9 43.8 14.3 43.5 53.3 -744 0.394 13A 41.7 14.8 68.6 71A 29.7 * 1.26
Relmqulst 46.2 81.0 56.3 71.4 43-5 73.3 -2184 1.089 15.5 65.8 34.8 96.8 71.4 5.7 2.92
O'Connor 33.3 73.7 56.3 71.4 39.1 733 -6269 3.180 18.1 69.0 32.9 105.1 57.1 -11.8 2.85
Scalia 30.8 76.2 563 71.4 26.1 60.0 -560 0.309 20.7 54.5 13.1 96.0 57.1 2.6 2.73
Steves 46.2 57.1 43.8 28.6 31.8 60.0 1301 -0.631 12.8 42.4 16.8 67.9 57.1 14.8 1.41
Kemedy 33.3 72.7 56-3 71.4 26.1 60.0 -447 0.251 19.5 54.2 15.2 93.1 429 -11.3 2.78
Maoity AllCes 38.5 59.1 43.8 71.4 26.1 66.7 -3905 1.989 17.6 57.9 22.6 93.2 57.1 -0.8 3.29 N
SplitDecisions 33.3 50.0 25.0 80.0 28.6 57.1 -6196 3.137 21.0 56.6 14.7 9.6 50.0 -6.6 3.36 #
Unmnous 42.9 70.0 50.0 50.0 222 75.0 -920 0.489 19.1 53.4 15.1 91.7 60.0 6.6 2.60
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TABLE 10a
SVING-VOTE ANALYSIS: 'WHO VOTES MOST OFTEN
WITH THE MAJORITY IN CLOSE CASES
%VOTES WITHMAJORITY
JUSTICE 1947 194 1949 1990 1991 1992 a Ib SE I (v) ILow I t v) Dif. sf. DW AC
Kennedy 71.4 2.4 71A 52.2 64.7 72.7 3809 -1.880 10.1 62.6 42.4 82.7 92.9 30.3 - 1.25
Rohnoulot 70.0 76.5 66.7 69.6 41.2 72.7 5154 .2.557 12.6 57.2 31.9 82.5 71A 14.3 2.36
Sc 66.7 73.5 66.7 52.2 35.3 81.8 3109 -1.531 16.6 57.3 24.2 90.5 71.4 14.1 1.99
O'connor 64.5 76.5 69.0 69.6 54.8 40.9 9755 -4.871 12.4 46.2 21.4 71.0 57.1 11.0 1.11
Bblckm 45.2 34.2 33.3 47.8 70.6 31.8 -2496 1.277 14.3 49.0 20.4 77.5 35.7 -13.2 2.14
St.vens 61,3 26.5 42.9 47.8 58.8 40.9 58 -0.006 12.8 46.3 20.8 71.9 35.7 -10.6 2.16
Conutvsdw
Coalilon 64.5 76.5 64.3 54.5 41.2 63.6 6893 -3434 11.9 48.7 25.0 72.5 64.3 15.5 1.49
ib'Colitlon 35.5 23.5 35.7 45.5 54.4 36.4 -6793 3434 11.9 51.3 27.5 75.0 35.7 -15.5 I 1.50,
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